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ABSTRACT 
TURKEY’S POLITICAL OBJECTIVES in the CAUCASUS 
DEMİRCİ, LEVENT 
 
M.A. in International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss 
June 2002, 129 pages 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey was under the impression that the 
collapse of the USSR and the independence of its 15 successor states have provided 
Turkey opportunities: Having historical and cultural ties with these republics, Turkey 
would be able to offer its model in Eurasia and make stronger its position in the 
region. Also, it could expand its influence as a regional power. Finally, Turkish 
engagement in this region could bring substantial benefit to the Turkish economy. 
Concomitantly, Western backing for the success of Turkish Model in the region was 
crucial and the West had backed it because of its strategic considerations. From the 
NIS standpoint, they turned to Ankara as their principal middleman in integrating 
into the international system.  
Today, general landscape is not the same as it was at the beginning of the 
1990s. From Turkey’s perspective, ten years have passed since the demise of the 
Soviet Union, and many of the Turkish expectations have not materialized. When 
Western information of the region and its economic, cultural and strategic matters 
increased, and new events took place. And the attractiveness of the Turkish Model or 
at least the backing of the West for this model weakened.  
 
 
Keywords: Turkey, regional, Eurasia, zone, security, sphere, influence, interest, 
regional power 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYENİN KAFKASYA’DA SİYASİ HEDEFLERİ 
DEMİRCİ, LEVENT 
 
Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
Haziran 2002, 129 Sayfa 
 1990’ların başlarında, Türkiye, Sovyetler Birliğinin yıkılması ve 15 
yeni cumhuriyetin bağımsızlığını kazanması ile, kendisine büyük şanslar doğduğunu 
düşündü. Bu ülkelerle tarihsel ve kültürel bağların bulunması nedeniyle, Türk 
modelini bölge ülkelerine tavsiye edebilecek ve bölgede durumunu 
kuvvetlendirebilecekti. Ayrıca bölgesel güç olarak etkisini arttırabilirdi. Son olarak, 
bu bölgedeki faaliyetleri Türk ekonomisine önemli ekonomik yararlar sağlayabilirdi. 
Bu paralelde, Türk modelinin başarısı için Batının desteği önemliydi ve Batı, 
stratejik düşünceler sebebiyle, Türkiye’yi destekledi.Yeni Bağımsızlığını Kazanan 
devletler açısından bakıldığında ise, uluslararası sisteme entegre olmaları konusunda 
Ankara’yı ana arabulucu olarak gördüler.  
Bugün ise genel manzara 1990’ların başlarındaki manzaradan farklı. Türkiye 
açısından bakıldığında, Sovyetler Birliğinin dağılmasından beri 10 yıldan fazla bir 
zaman geçti ve Türkiye’nin beklentilerinden çoğu gerçekleşmedi. Diğer yandan, 
Batının bölge hakkındaki bilgileri ile ekonomik, kültürel ve stratejik çıkarları 
arttıkça, bölge yeni olaylara sahne oldu. Ve Türk Modelinin çekiciliği, veya en 
azından model için Batının desteği azaldı. 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, bölgesel, Avrasya, alan, güvenlik, savunma,  etki  
 
bölgesi, ilgi bölgesi, çıkar, bölgesel güç  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After 1991, the independence of the former Soviet republics raised excessive 
expectations in Turkey. Turkish politicians, who had until then been only casually 
responsive to the survival of the "other Turks" in the Soviet Union, rediscovered the 
world of 120 million Turkic speakers. Turkey was under the impression that it would 
be able to offer its model as a secular state in Eurasia and make stronger its strategic 
position as a bridgehead between the East and West. It could struggle for a leading 
role in a region, involving the Central Asian republics, the Caucasus, the region 
around the Black Sea and the Balkans. Finally, Turkey anticipated important 
economic advantages from the dissolution of the Soviet Union.1 
From the Western standpoint, Western encouragement for Turkey's plans to 
increase its area of influence was clear. Throughout the Cold War, Turkey's long 
border shared with the Soviet Union gave it a very strategic position in the Western 
camp. It was also a neighbor of Israel's enemies, Syria and Iran. Turkey again 
demonstrated its strategic position before and during the Gulf War against Iraq. And, 
as a country rich in water, it had a very important positive feature in its association 
with its Arab neighbors. In November 1992, the Wall Street Journal reviewed the 
new perception of Turkey in leading circles in the West:  
Turkey is trying to help new Muslim countries become secular 
democracies. It is acting as a bridge between the West, the Balkans, and the 
Middle East. It is continuing its role as the West's vital security arm... In a 
region of old hostilities where weapons are everywhere and ethnic unrest is 
commonplace, Turkey's friendship is more vital to the West than ever.2 
 
                                                 
1 Freddy De Pauw, “Turkey's Policies in Transcaucasia”, in Bruno Coppieters, ed., Contested Borders 
in the Caucasus, (Brussels: VUB Press, 1996) p.179 
2 Wall Street Journal, November 20, 1992 quoted from Freddy De Pauw, “Turkey's Policies in 
Transcaucasia”, in Bruno Coppieters, ed., Contested Borders in the Caucasus, (Brussels: VUB Press, 
1996) p.179 
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Today, from Turkey’s perspective, general landscape is not the same as it was 
at the beginning of the 1990s. Ten years have passed since the demise of the Soviet 
Union, and many of the Turkish expectations have not materialized. Serious 
obstacles in extending its sphere of influence have confronted Turkey. In line with 
these considerations, by this thesis, it will be attempted to find and provide to the 
questions answers that are posed below: 
1.What is the importance of the Caucasus? 
2.What was the role and the goal of Turkish foreign policy? 
3.What are the conflicting interests of the states in the region? 
4. What were the handicaps of Turkish foreign policy during 1990-2000, and 
what must Turkey do to achieve its goals? 
By these questions, while the scope of this thesis is restricted to research the 
viewpoint of foreign policy considerations, it will be attempted to explain Turkey’s 
political objectives in the Caucasus. Together with its restrictions, the objective of 
this thesis will be to make available an explanation of Turkey’s power struggle in the 
region and its future implications. 
To fulfill visualized purposes in this thesis, a brief information about 
Caucasus affairs will be elucidated in Chapter II. From this point of view, firstly, a 
historical review of the events before disintegration of the Soviet Union will be made 
for understanding circumstances in the region at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Secondly, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will be analyzed. From the general 
outlook, to understand the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is a good example of 
manipulation, deadlock, great/regional power politics, and a new of type Russian 
arbitration and pragmatism in the Caucasus, is important because it gives some clues 
to the anatomy of Caucasian affairs and, from Turkey’s point of view, the Nagorno-
 3 
Karabakh conflict is one of the main deadlocks of regional cooperation in the 
Caucasus, which obstructs Turkey to assert its influence in the Caucasus. The 
common structure of the Caucasus and its importance in world politics will be 
evaluated in the last section. 
Chapter III will explain Turkey’s relations and interests in the region. In the 
first place, Turkey’s relations with Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the North 
Caucasus - although the North Caucasus is not an independent or sovereign entity, 
because the North Caucasus has a special place in Turkey’s contention with Russia in 
the Caucasus, it will be assessed separately - will be explained. In the second place, 
the energy security issue, which is an aspect of Turkey’s interest in the region, and 
Turkey’s main concern of becoming a regional actor in the Caucasus affairs will be 
detailed. 
Chapter IV will make clear the power struggle in the region; rivals of Turkey, 
Russia and Iran, and the partner of Turkey, the US, and Turkey’s relations with them 
will be assessed. In this analysis, the region will be evaluated from the viewpoint of 
Russia, Iran and the US and the strategic calculations that urge these states to be 
interested in this region will be clarified. 
In the last chapter of this thesis, an outline of the major answers to the 
research questions will be given and a presentation of its findings about the 
feasibility of Turkey’s objectives in the Caucasus will be made. 
The methodology used in this thesis relies mainly on a descriptive analysis of 
resources. The resources that are used are primary sources, including treaties and 
transcripts of government policy statements, and secondary resources such as 
scholarly and journal articles. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. THE CAUCASUS  
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's former national security adviser, sums 
up the worth of Eurasia as follows:  “About 75 percent of the world’s people live in 
Eurasia, and most of the world’s physical wealth is there as well, both in its 
enterprises and underneath its soil. Eurasia accounts for about 60 percent of world’s 
GNP and about three-fourths of the world’s known energy resources.”3 Brzezinski 
also emphasizes: “...the immediate task is to ensure that no state or combination of 
states gains the ability to expel the US or even diminish its decisive role.”4 As a 
corollary to this reality, it should be reminded that the Caucasus is the gate of 
Eurasia. Furthermore, the development of Caspian oil and gas, and political control 
of the Caucasus are significant aspects in raising the importance of the region in the 
West. Accordingly, it is the aim of this chapter to describe the importance of this 
region while highlighting historical events that occurred before 1991 and to present 
analysis of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Because the historical aspects and the overall 
facts are closely related and complementary, to explore the historical background 
firstly will help understand the importance and current affairs of the Caucasus. 
2.1. Historical Review of the Events before December 1991: 
Disintegration of the Soviet Union 
In the Caucasus, history has been written by external powers; during its past, 
the Caucasus was the region for the struggle of empires; the area where different 
cultures and faiths encountered one another. It has served both as a link and as a 
barrier to access between the North and South, and between the East and West. Its 
                                                 
3 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, (New York: Basic Books, 1997) p.31 
4 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Geostrategy for Eurasia”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.5, 
(September/October 1997) p.52 
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vital geopolitical position has been a diverse blessing. As a rule, the Caucasian states 
have lost rather than win by their critical location. External states have utilized tribal 
chiefs against their foes, seized the regions on which the Caucasian peoples have 
lived, expelled their people, or repressed them fiercely all through olden times.5 
For the Russian Empire and its successor state, the Soviet Union, the 
importance of the Caucasus was not different. During the 18th century, Russia aimed 
to ensure control over the South Caucasus in order to be capable of advance towards 
Persia and the Ottoman Empire. Its concerns were various: There were commercial 
profits and imperial aims, but nothing was equal to strategic calculations that 
prompted Russia to include South Caucasus into its territory. The South Caucasus 
would be a southern border from which Russia could build its next progress 
southward; it would also be a buffer zone, thus barring foreign powers from 
accessing Russia. Moreover, Peter the Great’s ambition to build Russia into a great 
European empire was linked to the Caucasus.6 In the following phase of history, in 
line with the policy of reaching “Warm Waters”, Russia thought to occupy Central 
Asia and the Caucasus to control “the heartland”7 so that they could easily 
manipulate the Southern Caucasian countries and the region’s wealth.8 
By the 19th   century, Tsarist Russia, and later the Soviet Union, gained control 
of the South Caucasus and retained it until the 1991 collapse of USSR (except for a 
brief interlude of Caucasian independence and intervention by other foreign powers 
between 1917 and 1921). During the Tsarist and particularly Soviet rule, 
                                                 
5 Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus, (London:  Curzon Press, 2001) p.18 
6 Ibid, p.32 
7 For information on “the heartland”, see Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth), 
(İstanbul: Küre yayınları, 2001) p.104. See also, Erol Mütercimler, 21. Yüzyıl ve Türkiye (21st 
Century and Turkey), (İstanbul: Güncel Yayınları, 2000) pp.98-99 
8 Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995) p.3 
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demographic changes took place within defined territorial homelands. The region’s 
economic and social development accelerated, but also the Caucasian peoples’ 
national identities and national consciousness shaped against Russian domination and 
Moscow’s nationalist policies. In this period, the Soviet regime also deliberately 
curtailed the region’s relations with its southern and western neighbors.9 
When it was the 1980s, the last episode of Russian rule began in the 
Caucasus. In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was voted first secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Gorbachev came on to the scene at a 
time when it appeared that the Soviet Union was at risk by having become over 
centralized, decayed and oppressed by the communist philosophy. Gorbachev’s 
restructurings began gradually and in 1986 he forced local governing bodies to take 
on more responsibilities. The next year, the first multicandidate elections took place 
in some areas. Then at a session of the CPSU in May 1987, he suggested two policies 
about his governmental reform and democratization program. “Perestroika” (the 
restructuring of the system or reorganization) and  “Glasnost” (encouraging public 
scrutiny of governmental institutes and stressing individual citizens’ rights) was 
completely contrary to the USSR’s founding doctrines and practices, with its secret 
method of working. The first clear signals of international vulnerability and the 
demise of the Soviet Union were the dramatic fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 
1989, followed on 6 July 1990, by the London Declaration that the Cold War 
between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact was terminated.10 
Political change in the USSR continued, and conservative factions, who 
worried about the loss of authority and job, were hesitant to see the transformation of 
the old order. On 19 August 1991, a coup was attempted and it was proclaimed that 
                                                                                                                                          
 
9 Edmund Herzig, The New Caucasus, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999) p.3 
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“as President Gorbachev is unable to perform his duties for health reasons”, 
presidential power had been transferred to Vice President Gennady Yanayev. At the 
end, Boris Yeltsin, the man who was the President of the Russian Federation, came 
to the forefront to resist the coup and was successful. However, on 24 August, 
Gorbachev kept his status as President, but quit from his post as CPSU Secretary, 
saying that it should break itself up.11 
But subsequently, by the general social-economic and political failure of the 
Soviet system, the disintegration of USSR took place. In the course of two short 
weeks in December 1991, Presidents of the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine 
got together and affirmed that the USSR period was formally ended, and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established.12 
Today, the collapse of the Soviet Union has revitalized the "Great Game" that 
Russia and England vied in the 19th century for control in Central Asia. This time the 
game has a number of new players.13 Contrary to the situation in the 19th century, 
national leaders now have little opposition to foreign participation in the region. That 
is, they are actively seeking foreign backers, plus models, and help on which to build 
their development.14 However, there are some serious conflicts in the Caucasus, such 
as the one is Nagorno-Karabakh, which complicates an already complex situation 
further. 
2.2.The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Its Importance for the Region 
In the early 19th century a Russian Commander wrote: 
                                                                                                                                          
10 Edgar O’Balance, Wars in the Caucasus, 1990-1995, (London: Macmillan Press, 1997) pp.1-3 
11 Ibid, pp.6-10 
12 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, (New York: Basic Books, 1997) p.88 
13 P. Pavillionis and R. Giragosian “The Great Game: Pipeline Politics in Central Asia” Harvard 
International Review, Vol. 19, Issue 1, (Winter96/97) p.24. Available at Online Database of 
EBSCOhost with Item No: 9710310658  
14 Mustafa Aydın, New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus Causes of Instability and 
Predicament, SAM Papers No.2/2000, (Ankara: Center For Strategic Research, 2000) Available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/sam/20.htm 
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Upon arriving in the Caucasus, be sure to follow these guidelines in 
dealing with the natives: 
• Refrain from anything that could weaken their perception of our 
power; the principal source of our strength in these regions. 
• Establish commercial relations so as to generate among them needs 
that they still do not feel 
• Maintain continuous state of dissension among their diverse nations 
and never forget that their unity could be fatal for us 
• Introduce among them the light of Christianity 
• Absolutely prevent them from the possibility of links with Turkey and 
Persia. 
Marquis Philippe Paulucci 
Russian Commander; 1816 15 
The Russian Commander’s suggestions explain the Russian policy in the 
Caucasus: From the early 19th century and beyond, Russia set up its control in the 
Caucasus. For Russia, to have several multi-ethnic groups of people was a domestic 
weaknesses, and could create a "window of opportunity" for its rivals and outside 
powers. Because of this reason, Russia tried to provoke hostility among the local 
players with the aim of securing its hold on the Caucasus. Generally, "divide and 
rule" was the preferred tactic to guarantee imperial peace. Over the centuries, a 
model of client relationships was created. This type of relationship put St Petersburg, 
and later Moscow, in the position of an arbiter to which all sides in any internal 
conflict had to appeal and whose decision they had to respect. Having assumed that 
role, Russia then had to perform in a flexible manner and presented great pragmatism 
in the sphere of conflict management. There were almost not any groups left which 
did not have an objection of some kind against the Russians, although, ironically, all 
groups were seriously reliant on Russia. 16 
In this context, after the demise of the USSR, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
is a good example of manipulations, deadlocks, great/regional power politics, and 
presents a new type of Russian arbitration and pragmatism in the Caucasus. From 
                                                 
15 Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995) p.12 
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this perspective, to understand the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict gives some clues to 
the anatomy of Caucasian affairs such as the South Ossetia-Georgia conflict of 1990-
92, and Abhazia-Georgia conflict of 1992-93. From Turkey’s point of view, the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of the main deadlocks of regional cooperation in 
the Caucasus, which obstructs Turkey to assert its influence in the Caucasus. So, the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict needs to be outlined in detail. 
Nagorno-Karabakh is a place in the middle of Azerbaijan. To the west, lies 
Armenia, less than five miles. Iran is approximately 15 miles to the south. The two 
major settlements of the enclave are Stepanakert, the capital, and Shusha.17 And this 
region has special emotional and historic meaning for both Azerbaijanis and 
Armenians. For Azerbaijanis, the region symbolizes the place where their national 
consciousness was first initiated. In the late 19th century, and early 20th, Nagorno-
Karabakh was the core of Azeri cultural renaissance. Indeed, the Karabakh issue has 
been the principal motivation behind the emergence of Azerbaijani nationalism in 
recent years. For the Armenians, Karabakh is a symbol of the only place that a flicker 
of Armenian independence survived until 1828, albeit under Persian control. 
Karabakh also represents the only part of historic Armenia, outside the boundary of 
Armenia, where the greater part of the people is still Armenian. 18 
The origin of the current conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh appeared in the 18th 
century. According to Russian census reports, the Armenian population in lower 
Karabakh was 9 % of the total in 1823 (others registered as “Muslim”), 35 % in 1832 
                                                                                                                                          
16 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Security Interests and Policies in the Caucasus”, in Bruno Coppieters, ed., 
Contested Borders in the Caucasus, (Brussels: VUB Press, 1996) p.92 
17 Kenneth Shaitelman, “The Azerbaijan-Armenia Conflict: The War in Nagorno-Karabakh, Section 
907, and their Impact on Oil Pipeline Routes”, in Professor H. Feiveson, ed., Individual Paper, WWS 
401c: Energy Policy, the Environment, and the Gulf States, Woodrow Wilson School Of Public And 
International Affairs and Princeton University, (January 4, 1999). 
Available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~wws401c/1998/ken.html 
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and 53 % in 1880.19 This dramatic change can be explained by Russian policy. After 
the first Russo-Persian war of 1812-1813, the Treaty of Gulistan transferred 
Karabakh from ostensible Persian control to Russian rule. Persian supported revolts 
in Karabakh, whose majority of population was Azerbaijanis, which led to the 
second Russo-Persian war, and the 1828 Turkmanchai Treaty was signed. After the 
treaty, Russia began to implement a new plan; the Azerbaijani population was 
exchanged with Armenian population to secure the region. The process accelerated 
after every Russo-Turkish war (1855-56 and 1877-78) as Russians saw the 
Azerbaijanis as undependable and possible partners of the Turks. In contrast, the 
Armenians were seen as Russia’s natural allies in the region.20 By this policy, Russia 
created cracks so as to make the exploitation of ethnic distinctions easy and so fortify 
central authorities.21 
A change in attitudes appeared during the 1920s: Turkey and the Soviet 
Union signed the Moscow Treaty22 on 16 March 1921, and it was determined that 
Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh would be under the authority of the Azerbaijani 
                                                                                                                                          
18 Shireen T. Hunter, “Azerbaijan: Searching for New Neighbors”, in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, 
eds., New States New Politics: Building the Post Soviet Nations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997) p.445 
19 Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus, (London:  Curzon Press, 2001) p.68 It must be noted that some experts on the Caucasus 
don’t accept this fact. According to their views, the origin of the current conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh 
appeared in the 1920s. See, for instance, Svante Cornell “Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh 
Conflict Reconsidered”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.20, No.4, (Fall 
1997) p.2 and Kenneth Shaitelman, idem.,  
20 Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition, (New York: 
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http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/sam/20.htm 
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Soviet Socialist Republic In 1924, Nakhichevan received the status of an 
autonomous republic (the NASSR) whereas Nagorno-Karabakh had been accorded 
the status of an Autonomous Oblast (the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast). It 
looked as if this change was a deal between the two countries;23 the Bolsheviks were 
firstly prone to Kemal Atatürk, by seeing him a potential ally. Both were in revolt 
against the former régimes of their own countries, and were engaged in wars with the 
western powers, especially Britain. During the independence war of Turkey, the 
Turkish nation effectively resisted the unratified Sèvres Treaty24 that was planning to 
set up an autonomous Kurdish area, but an independent Armenian state in Anatolia.25 
After the war, Atatürk was unwilling to get involved with any territorial 
arrangements siding with Soviet Armenia, as a strong Armenia could have territorial 
demands on Turkey. Thus, in the long run26, preserving Armenia as ineffectual was a 
way to make certain the territorial integrity of the growing Turkey.27 Lenin also 
aimed at calming the Muslim people, who were being controlled by the Soviets. 
Azerbaijan, with its larger population and vital oil resources and which, like 
Kemalist Turkey, was seen by the Bolsheviks as a potential for uprising in the East, 
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and seemed more central than Armenia from the viewpoint of the Bolshevik 
revolution.28 
Armenia has always tried to rearrange the state, mainly at times of change in 
Soviet control or policy. The inactive Armenian claims appeared again in the last 
part of the 1980s, with the Glasnost policy of Gorbachev. So the number of incidents 
between the two populaces grew quickly from 1987 and beyond. Numerous events 
commenced to intensify in the political arena and media of the Soviet Union. In 
August 1987, a petition prepared by the Armenian Academy of Sciences asked for 
the turn over of Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan to the Armenian SSR.29 
On 20 February 1988, the Soviet Oblast of the NKAO assessed the results of 
an informal referendum on the joining of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, with a 
petition signed by 80,000 people. In 1979, the total populace of the NKAO was 
162,000, with 123,000 Armenians and 37,000 Azerbaijanis. Due to that referendum, 
the session of the Soviet Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh referred the demands to the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Azerbaijan and Armenia, asking them to approve the 
separation of Karabakh from Azerbaijan and its annexation to Armenia, but Baku 
refused.  The Center seemed to wait, giving the Azerbaijani authorities the chance to 
solve the crisis. 30 
 On 27 February, violent riots erupted in Karabakh and two Azeri youths were 
murdered. Then, inter-communal aggression worsened quickly. It is noted that ethnic 
cleansing was carried in different ways in the two republics: generally by systematic 
and total action in Armenia, and largely by abrupt violent, and unstructured events in 
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Azerbaijan.31 Soviet leaders’ retort to use force for shielding civilians caused to set 
free a cycle of violence in the Caucasus.32 
 In Yerevan, an effort by protests to upset air traffic at Zvartnots airport 
impelled Moscow to use armed force. On 4 July 1988, the army effectively dispelled 
the protests, killing one student. In Karabakh and Armenia, people boycotted the 
Soviet Union.33 
But on 12 July 1988, the NKAO Oblast Soviet decided to secede from 
Azerbaijan and join Armenia.34 The AzSSR Supreme Soviet canceled the decision 
the same day. So the war of will all through the USSR began. The NKAO had 
detached all links with Baku. 35 
Important decisions were taken in December 1989. On December 1st, the 
Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia approved a decision, which integrated 
the NKAO into the Republic of Armenia. Later on, the NKAO voted for seceding 
from Azerbaijan. The Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan immediately rebuffed the 
decision, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union declared it invalid.36 
In January 1990, in Baku, Azerbaijanis refugees, who were expelled from 
Armenia by government policy,37 initiated a pogrom on Armenians, while the Soviet 
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army appeared in Baku.38 Armenia criticized the riots, condemned Moscow for not 
interfering, and, the Soviet army intervened militarily. 39 
As the parties appeared to prepare for a military solution, paramilitary 
structures got bigger on both sides. A substantial flow of arms from Armenia to 
Karabakh and help of Russian "volunteers" (Most "volunteers" were regular soldiers 
of the Soviet armed forces) helped take control of Nagorno-Karabakh.40 
On 2 September, the Karabakh Soviet, renamed as the ‘Karabakh National 
Council’, declared the independence Nagorno-Karabakh over the territory of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and the Shaumianiovsk region of 
Azerbaijan.41 
On 31 August 1991, the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet agreed to a statement on 
the reestablishment of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan, the one that had 
survived in 1918-20.42 Armenia interpreted that the legal base for the Soviet-era 
autonomous status of the NKAO was now cancelled. Karabakh answered to the 
declaration of Azerbaijanis independence by stating the establishment of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) on 2 September 1991. The NKR was declared 
within the boundaries of the previous autonomous oblast and of the Shaumian Raion. 
On 26 November 1991, the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet approved a regulation 
eliminating the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh. On 10 December, the NKR 
Supreme Soviet, comprising only Armenians, declared the independence and 
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separation of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan on account of a referendum by the 
Armenian populace.43 
After the independence of Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1991 and the departure 
of Russian forces from Nagorno-Karabakh in early 1992, the conflict developed into 
an all-out war. By mid-1992, Nagorno-Karabakh was cleansed of its non-Armenian 
population, with the support of Armenia44 and Russia.45 A 50-mile-long highway 
through Azerbaijan’s Lachin region, which is under control of Karabakh military 
forces, actually connected the enclave with Armenia and created a single economic 
area with Armenia,46 which remains to date. 
By the result of this all-out war, not only the land of the NKAO was in the 
hands of Armenian forces, but also were the adjacent and nearby regions, which were 
homogeneously Azerbaijani-populated. Entirely, over 20% of Azerbaijan lands 
remain under occupation. This resulted in a serious refugee catastrophe in 
Azerbaijan.  Azerbaijan had to provide shelter for between 1.000.000 and 1.200.000 
people; there were 300.000 refugees that had arrived from Armenia from 1988 
onwards, and the internally displaced persons amount to between 600.000 and 
800.000 people. Ten to fifteen percent of the people of the country are displaced 
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people, some of whom are still living with no stable housing or support.47 The 
international community, for what some call ethnic cleansing, has condemned 
Armenia,48 but to no avail. 
The UN Security Council has approved four resolutions, 822, 853, 874, and 
88449, recommending the urgent withdrawal of all forces from the occupied 
Azerbaijani territories. Armenia has by no means obeyed these resolutions. 50 
With the aim of finding a peaceful settlement, the OSCE51 got involved in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on 24 March 1992. The Minsk Group, that was set up in 
1992 and comprised Belarus, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, 
Sweden, Turkey, and the US, of the OSCE hammered out a political solution on the 
basis of The UN Security Council resolutions, 822, 853, 874, and 884 and a cease-
fire regime was concluded on May 12, 1994.52 Also, in the 1996 Lisbon Summit, 
OSCE authorized the following principles for a fair solution to the conflict: 
-Territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan 
Republic; 
-Legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in an agreement based 
on self-determination which confers on Nagorno-Karabakh the highest 
degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan; 
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-Guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole 
population, including mutual obligations to ensure compliance by all the 
Parties with the provisions of the settlement.53 
 Currently, for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there is no urgent wish on 
either side to achieve a political resolution to the conflict. Both believe that time is 
on their side. Armenians rely on their military dominance and suppose that 
Azerbaijan can never attain the military capability to reconquer Nagorno-Karabakh. 
To encounter the possibility of an Azerbaijani effort at resolving the conflict forcibly, 
Armenia has formed strong military relations with Russia. Quite the opposite, 
Azerbaijan, believes that Armenia cannot continue its position ultimately, and with 
increasing oil incomes, Azerbaijan can develop a strong army, and either enforce a 
political solution on Armenia or resort to a military one. On this point, the Armenian-
Azerbaijani struggle has across-the-board consequences for the region. For the 
Caucasus, its main implication is that it causes to be unfeasible for the Caucasian 
states to do something in cooperation unless there is outside coercion in the region. 
The reality is that relations between the two warring countries follow the rules of a 
zero-sum game, which allows the opportunity for extra-regional actors to intervene 
in the Caucasus by providing support to either party, so shifting the balance of power 
in the area. This, of course, leads to persistent political instability in the Caucasus. 
Moreover, it results in economic underdevelopment of the region. In practice, the 
conflict has disallowed the appearance of a stable and democratic political order. The 
recent conflicts have also made the Caucasian states tend to political violence and 
overthrow of governments, and have blocked the progress towards democratization. 
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This in turn serves the interests of the former hegemonic power, Russia, which to a 
great extent has supported centrifugal forces in the region with a view of 
deteriorating the existing states and making them more agreeable to Russian 
manipulation. In the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, Russia gives the impression of 
pursuing a policy of weakening both parties by giving them different amount of 
support at different times.54 
 Considering that democratization does not happen automatically, even when 
induced, it may be realistic of small states to search for support from stronger 
neighbors. In turn, however, smaller states may captivate a good portion of its 
stronger counterpart to the detriment of regional peace, as may be case in Russo-
Armenian relation or in Turco-Azerbaijani relation. 
2.3. The Common Structure of the Caucasus and Its Importance in 
World Politics 
The Caucasus region, parceled into the North and South Caucasus, has 
geostrategic importance. It not only provides a place of encounter between the East 
and West, but more notably lies on a vital North-South axis. The land corridor of the 
Transcaucasia (a term stems from Russian and means 'the lands beyond the Caucasus 
mountains' 55) assists in dealings with or conflict among Russia, Turkey and Iran.56 
The geographical border of the Caucasus has no common boundaries upon 
which everyone agrees. The main delimitation is geographical: the Caucasus 
constitutes the mountainous area between the seashores of the Black and Caspian 
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seas. In the political terminology, the most correct description is the northern border 
of the North Caucasian Autonomous republics with Krasnodar and Stavropol Krai, 
where mainland Russia starts. In the West, the borderline is the section where 
Turkic-populated areas meet regions inhabited by Georgians and Armenians. The 
proper southern border is more difficult to describe, as demographically the whole 
area is peopled by Azerbaijani Turks; but Iran's northern border is accepted as 
Azerbaijan’s southern border. In terms of the current political map, the Caucasus 
region includes three entire states - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia - and a part of a 
fourth: the North Caucasus shaping a part of the Russian Federation. The Caucasus 
contains an area of about 400.000 square km, with a people of over 20 million. The 
demarcation is made difficult by the fact that the executive units in the North 
Caucasus are drawn further north than the traditional places of residence for their 
ostensible nations to dilute the demographic composition of these regions.57 
The ethno-linguistic map of the Caucasus is difficult to draw. However, it is a 
key to understand the politics of the current Caucasus. The Transcaucasus is 
relatively easier to plot. It contains three major peoples, the Azerbaijanis, Georgians 
and Armenians, and a number of mixed peoples, some of which are indigenous 
peoples. All of the republics are multi-ethnic.58 
The North Caucasus contains several groups. The first can be named as 
indigenous Caucasian peoples. These are the Vainakh peoples (Chechens, Ingush, 
and Tsova-Tush) and Dagestanis - such as the Avars, Lezgins and Dargins - in the 
North-East; and the Abkhaz and Circassian peoples (sub-divided rather tribally into 
Kabardins, Adyge, and Cherkess) in the North-West. Ethnologists infer that these 
groups do not have an origin beyond the Caucasus. The second group are the 
                                                 
57 Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus, (London:  Curzon Press, 2001) p.18 
 20 
pioneers of Turkic and Persian origin.  Ossetians and Tat are the only peoples of 
sizeable size to claim Persian origin. The Turkic peoples are related to the Kipchak 
family of languages, and consist of the Karachai and Balkar in Central North 
Caucasus, and the Kumyk and Nogai in Dagestan. To the extent that religious 
matters are concerned, the Caucasian diversity is equally prominent; believers of all 
world religions are present in the area.59 
The North Caucasus also contains considerable natural resources; it can be 
said that one of the coveted resources on earth is in the Caspian Sea region that vies 
in amount with the riches of Saudi Arabia. Proven reserves in the Caspian region are 
15-31 billion barrels of oil (2.7% of world reserves) and 230-360 trillion cubic feet 
(Tcf) of gas (7% of world reserves).60 Potential gas reserves are as large as the 
Caspian’s proven gas reserves, and could yield another 328 Tcf, if proven.61 It is 
predicted that the Caspian holds no less than 200 billion barrels of oil62 and in 2010 it 
is estimated to produce 3.2 billion barrels of crude oil per day, and 4850 billion cubic 
feet of natural gas per year.63 Besides the strategically important oil fields, also 
important fish stocks are located at the Caspian Basin.64 
It is true that the development of Caspian oil and gas is one significant aspect 
in raising the importance of the Caucasus and Central Asia in the West. However 
important oil has been, it is despite everything far from the only factor affecting the 
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geo-strategic meaning of the district. Ever since 1991, a struggle has been happening 
for economic and political control in this southern border of the former USSR. While 
Russia has been making efforts to reassert its influence over former territory, new 
actors such as Turkey and Iran penetrated where they could not accurately estimate 
their place in the beginning. More remote actors entered the competition later, for 
various reasons: the US and the EU, the latter mostly in the economic area. However, 
the Caucasian states are weak in contrast to their neighbors. They always fear, 
especially, Russian interference in their domestic affairs and discern a need to find 
partners against pressures from their small or large neighbors. In summation, the role 
of the region in international affairs is on the rise. The US has, for example, 
identified the Caspian as an area of very important US interests.65  
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CHAPTER 3 
3. TURKEY in the CAUCASUS 
The emergence of sovereign Transcaucasus states has significantly altered 
Eurasian geopolitics.66 Additionally, it gave the chance of re-establishing a close but 
complex link between Turkey and the Caucasus that had existed for centuries.67 At 
the beginning, the new states faced many troubles; but their main interest was the 
strengthening of their independent position.68 In this context, the Turkish Model was 
accepted. It can be said that while the model has some limitations, three main factors 
made it appealing for Western support to be emulated by the newly independent 
states; secularism and democracy, common culture, and the Turkish experimentation 
in economic change.69 
Despite the expression during the early 1990s of a “Turkic 21st Century”,70 
today, Turkey has made no attempt to dominate the Caucasus.71 Turkey’s 
geopolitical location gives it an important advantage over other players in the area.72 
Turkey’s interest for the time being lies in increasing cultural, political and economic 
relationships with Turkic republics. In this framework, Turkey is following a number 
of policies73, which are effective in bringing the people of the Turkic republics and 
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Turkey closer, the meaning of which will only become clear ultimately.74 İsmail 
Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister, explains Turkey’s approach as follows:  
...the Caucasus should not be treated as the backyard of any 
neighboring country. I think this is important because neighbors and others 
tend to see the Caucasus as a backyard for their own political or economic 
interests. The Caucasus should not be a place which nurtures problems for its 
neighbors. 75 
 
Turkey supposes that the peaceful ending of all the problems in the Caucasus 
will improve political stability and economic interests of all Caucasian states and will 
inaugurate a state of affairs for regional collaboration and support. 76 For example, 
Turkey declared that: 
…the Nagorno-Karabakh issue should be handled in a way which 
would not result in creating instability within the two countries involved. 
This would be disastrous politically and economically - both for the parties 
and for the region – and conductive to infiltration.77 
   
Turkey has also supported these new states to institute bilateral and 
multilateral affairs with all of the international community. In this respect, it has 
worked to help their involvement in the UN, OSCE, NACC, and other international 
institutions. Turkey accepts as true that the wider participation of the Caucasian 
Republics in the Euro-Atlantic community will play a role in the improvement of 
Eurasian peace and stability.78   
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In reality, beyond any dispute, for Turkey’s part the south Caucasus is of 
particular geopolitical notice for three reasons. First, the region is an access to 
Central Asia. Second, it offers direct entry to the markets of the West for oil and gas. 
Third, Azerbaijan and Georgia are of the supreme strategic importance to Turkey. 
Their independence and territorial integrity are considered as vital for the security 
and stability of both the Caucasus and Central Asia.79 
3.1. Turkey and Georgia 
 3.1.1. Events of the 1990s 
For Georgia, beginning of the 1990s was problematic. With perestroika and 
glasnost, the economic crisis, the absence of centralized power, the emergence of 
ethnically based political parties and the revival of unpleasant national memories 
raised the risks of ethnic competition. The minority’s emphasis for cultural and 
educational equality heartened Georgians to back nationalist policies intended to 
defend the majority, rather than minority rights. As a reply, the Ossetians and 
Abkhazians began to make plans for establishing formal opposition forces. After the 
removal of Zviad Gamsakhurdia80 in January 1992, Eduard Shevardnadze came to 
power in March at the invitation of the Georgian Military Council. In this period, 
subsequent to the full-size wars, deep hostility between Georgia and Abkhazia, plus 
South Ossetia led to their de facto separation from Georgia under Russian 
protection.81 
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Gamsakhurdia’s plan to take advantage of the damaging influence of the 
Abkhazian-Georgian war caused an endeavor to retake power in Tbilisi. 
Shevardnadze was obliged to call on the Russian military and consent to have 
Georgia enter the CIS; so Russia became firmer about reinstating its hegemony in the 
region. On February 3, 1994, Georgia and Russia signed a military cooperation treaty 
that let Russia keep three military bases82 in Georgia, and Russia agreed training and 
equipping a new Georgian army.83 
3.1.2. Relations Between Turkey and Georgia 
When political events are analyzed, it can be concluded that Vladimir Putin’s 
chief objective has been to keep Georgia in the Russian sphere of influence.84 On the 
other hand, like Russia, Turkey and the US are aware that Azerbaijan would be 
isolated from its Western allies with no stability and an anti-Western government in 
Georgia.85 Because of this reason, relations with Georgia have deepened, especially 
in the military field. In March 1999, Turkey and Georgia signed a treaty on military 
assistance and collaboration. This military assistance is part of a broader attempt by 
Georgia to strengthen its independence and connections to the West, including 
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NATO.86 In this way, positive developments and close political ties are formed by 
the close relationship: Turkish trade with Georgia is expanding progressively. 
Cultural and academic projects are developing.87  
For the sake of good relations, both countries have the good sense to avoid 
making any irredentist moves.88 For example, when Abkhaz pro-home rule 
supporters wanted to separate Abkhazia from Georgia without delay after 
independence, Turkey comprehended that they were influenced by Russia for their 
interests in North Caucasus and did not get involved in the dispute. Also, Turkey has 
backed both the UN observer force in Abkhazia and international endeavors to solve 
the crisis.89  
Concomitantly, there is a growing consciousness that the different conflicts of 
the Caucasus cannot be considered wholly apart from each other and the geopolitical 
surroundings. Rather, there is a growing tendency toward a more holistic attitude to 
conflict resolution in the region.90 In this regard, Turkey and Georgia launched a 
joint initiative to create a “South Caucasus Stability Pact.”91 The pact is planned to 
promote Turkey’s profile in the region. Furthermore, by containing other Western 
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powers, Turkey is looking to legitimize Western involvement in the area. The offer 
has the support of Azerbaijan with key Western governments, including the US.92 
3.2. Turkey and the North Caucasus 
It is true that the North Caucasus is not an independent or sovereign entity; on 
the contrary, it is part of Russia.  But, Turkey’s contention with Russia in the 
Caucasus all through the 19th century is indispensable to understand Turkish attitudes 
and guiding principles concerning the Caucasus at the end of the 20th. Each Russia-
Turkish war resulted in a Turkish effort to support Caucasian peoples against the 
Russians, but in the end Russian armies won out and employed an ethnic cleansing 
on a colossal extent; and these movements resulted in the immigration of large 
numbers of people to Turkey. Consequently, the Turkish Republic that recovered 
from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 had a population of 13 million that 
was composed of, perhaps, as many as 2 million (15 percent) people of Caucasian 
origin. 93 
3.2.1. Importance of and Events in the North Caucasus 
With a general outlook, wars in the North Caucasus can be grouped into two 
categories in the post-Cold War era: conflicts among the peoples of the region, and 
conflicts between these people and Russia.94 The main example of the first type has 
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been the war between the Ingush and Ossetians.95 If it not been for the criminally 
accused deportation of the Ingush in 1946, and the following alterations in the 
borders of Chechen-Ingush ASSR, there might have been no cause for conflict. But, 
with the Prigoridniy conflict, an intensifying gap between two Caucasian peoples has 
been produced. It was effective in making permanent Russian military existence in 
the area and Russia was successful in restoring total control over this strategic part of 
the North Caucasus.96 
Also, the second type of conflict has been the war in Chechnya. Russia argues 
that losing Chechnya would lead to the break-up of the Russian Federation, as had 
happened to the Soviet Union. It is true that the strategic worth of the North 
Caucasus is established by the geostrategic gains of the Russian Federation or the 
fact that this region forms the strategic south of Russia, which is at present the area 
most threatened in terms of territorial integrity.97 More to the point, a major motive 
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to invade Chechnya in late 1994 was related to Azerbaijani oil.  The sole operational 
pipeline able to carry Azerbaijani oil to world markets was the Baku-Novorossiysk 
pipeline and it passed through Chechnya. So, Russian power over Azerbaijan had 
now become directly linked to the control of Chechnya.98 As a last reason, Russia's 
leaders have tried to use the problems in Chechnya to solve political problems in the 
Kremlin.99 
However, the direct cost of the first Chechen war was most shocking in the 
Russian army itself. Besides heavy losses, it suffers now from a sharp decline in 
morale and weakening "defeat syndrome," which worsens the results of the old 
"Afghan syndrome." More importantly, Russia and its rivals became increasingly 
aware of the limits of military capabilities of Russia.100 In a sense, the Chechens 
helped Turkey and the others to see the dismal status of the Russian army and 
reduced Russia’s ability to deter interested states from approaching the Caucasus.101 
For the Caucasus, the war is not in the interest of any state. Continuing 
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hostilities may jeopardize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Southern 
Caucasus states. Moreover, they could menace the transport routes of Caspian oil and 
the potential progress of a new Silk Road.102 In addition, there is some anxiety that 
the hostilities also threaten the future of Russian democracy, and jeopardize civilian 
control of the military.103 
3.2.2. Relations that Generate From the North Caucasus 
 It is estimated that there are just about a population of ten million in Turkey 
whose families generated from the north Caucasus and the Transcaucasus. Parts of 
these regions were once governed by the Ottoman Empire over time. There are today 
at least 47 official Caucasian solidarity associations active in Turkey. These groups 
consistently press the Turkish government to take a firmer stand against Russian 
interference in the Transcaucasus and are in opposition to Russian military 
operations in Chechnya. Although sensitive to these lobbies, Turkish administrators 
are also cautious not to provoke their Russian neighbor needlessly. Turkey is 
cautious that if Russia observes Turkey to be overly sensitive to the Chechen issue, 
Russian officials could play the so-called “Kurdish Card”. Turkish administrators are 
also enthusiastic for Turkey to become an important regional stabilizing power, and 
are stressing the need to resolve disputes in the Transcaucasus by peaceful ways.104 
In this framework, Turkey’s official Chechnya policy is expressed in several 
Foreign Ministry declarations such that as Turkey desires a peaceful resolution to the 
Chechen question within the territorial integrity of Russia, in reference to 
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international law and the Geneva Convention;105 but when the humanitarian aspect of 
Chechen war is involved, probably minding Turkish citizens of Chechen origins, 
Turkey classifies it as an international issue. Yet, Turkish foreign policy behavior 
generally does not discriminate about humanitarian issues. Turkey sent help to 
Armenia in its disastrous earthquake of 1988. 
On the other hand, the carrying on of the Chechnya war has illustrated that 
Moscow describes Russia's strategic interests and the risks to Russia in terms that are 
not at all friendly to the West, and that contains Turkey.106 For example, Russia 
trespassed the current CFE treaty in the first Chechen war. It then asked for a change 
of the treaty, which the US accepted. Now, Russia is in violation of the modified 
CFE treaty, which was signed at the OSCE summit in Istanbul on November 19, 
1999. It has exceeded the limits of aircraft and heavy military equipment it is 
permitted to keep in the Caucasus. Before signing the document, Russia insisted on 
an expansion of the flank limitations, and NATO accepted this. To date, Moscow has 
proclaimed that it will obey the treaty after it ends the Chechen operation. 107 And 
Turkey is in no position to object to this situation, because Southeast Turkey was 
also exempted from CFE limitations. 
3.3. Turkey and Armenia  
3.3.1. The So-called “Genocide” Claims 
After a number of mutual tragic encounters in the early 20th century, the 
Turkish Republic chose to bury historical antagonism. Should the Republic not have 
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chosen to do this, demographic, political, geographic boundaries as well as public 
relations would have taken a different course today. But Turkey has given no sign of 
a hostile plan toward Armenia.108 On the contrary, when Armenia faced a shocking 
earthquake in 1988, Turkey provided sizeable aid.109 
First of all, the memory of Armenian ‘treason” (in the eyes of Turks) and 
“genocide”110 (in the eyes of Armenians) has a deep effect on both sides that has 
roots in the 19th century history.111 The main drive for what was to become the 
Armenian-Muslim conflict rested in Russian imperial expansion.112 In each Russo-
Turkish war from the mid-19th century to WW I, Russia looked to utilize Ottoman 
Armenians and other eastern Anatolian Christians as a fifth column.113  
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Understanding that their numbers would never justify their territorial 
aspirations114, Armenians looked to Russia and Europe for the implementation of 
their aims. Armenian treason in this regard culminated at the beginning of the First 
World War with the decisions of revolutionary organizations to reject assisting the 
Ottoman Empire, and help occupying Russian armies.115 Although the Ottoman 
government promised autonomy to the Armenians if they remained neutral or 
supported their state,116 Armenians expected that their role in a Russian victory 
would be rewarded by an independent Armenian state.117  
The Ottoman answer to the Armenian rebellion was about the same as that 
taken by other 20th century governments experienced with civil war: separating the 
guerrillas from regional backing by removing the local supporters. They then decided 
on an act: relocation118 of the Armenian population in real or potential war zones. 
The key points of this decision to relocate were: 
When those of Armenian residents in the aforementioned towns and 
villages who have to be moved are transferred to their places of settlement and 
are on the road, their comfort must be assured and their lives and property 
protected; after their arrival their food should be paid for out of Refugees’ 
Appropriations until they are definitively settled in their new homes. Property 
and land should be distributed to them in accordance with their previous 
financial situation as well as current needs; and for those among them needing 
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further help, the government should build houses, provide cultivators and 
artisans with seed, tools, and equipment.119 
 
Given that many lives were lost during the resettlement, Armenians allege 
that this was a “genocide”. But, in the “Convention On The Prevention And 
Punishment Of The Crime Of Genocide”120 the term genocide specifies a clear-cut 
crime and described by the existence of three elements: there has to be a targeted 
national, ethnic, racial and religious group; this group has to be subjected to certain 
inhuman acts; the existence of conclusive proof that there has been “an intent of 
destroying ” the group in part or in whole. In the convention, also, two points are 
emphasized: First, genocide is a crime of “specific intent”, requiring convincing 
evidence that members of the group are targeted because they were members of that 
group. Second, political groups are not given protection by the Convention. Indeed, 
Armenians were not able to reveal any exact evidence indicating that the Ottoman 
government took action with the intent to destroy them partly of wholly. Also, 
Armenians were the belligerent party in the war; this requires that the Armenian 
question be dealt with under the laws of war.121 Not to mention the fact that word 
“genocide” was used after WWII to cover Jewish Holocaust. 
Then, why are the Turks blamed of a nasty crime they did not execute? The 
reply is both emotional and political. Many Armenians think that Turks were guilty; 
they have only heard of casualties of their ancestors, not the casualties of Turks. 
However, the ultimate aim of the Armenians is to first to obtain ‘reparations’, and 
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then claim Eastern Anatolia as their own.122 This would hardly hold up at a court of 
law shorn of prejudice. 
 3.3.2. Relations Between Turkey and Armenia 
For Turkey’s part, there was no problem until the beginning of the emergence 
of Armenian irredentist move as Mustafa Kemal expressed: 
The Armenian issue, which aims at meeting the economic interests of 
the capitalist world rather than bearing in mind the veritable interests of the 
Armenians themselves, was best resolved with the Kars Agreement. The 
friendly ties between two industrious people coexisting peacefully for 
centuries have been satisfactorily established anew.123 
From the viewpoint of Turkey, Armenia's irredentist move is clear. Despite 
the fact that Armenia is the smallest of the union states, it has territorial demands 
from Turkey124, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Briefly, this reality is the territorial 
imperative issue in the enhancement of the Armenian nationalism.125  For example, 
the Nagorno-Karbakh conflict was foreseeable given Armenia’s willpower to unite 
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Armenian-speaking territory under its own aegis – even when actually separated.126 
Also, at the shaping of policies, the Dashnak Party, which is a group of diaspora 
radicals for Armenian nationalism, has great influence on the government.127 
Indeed, at the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey began to implement a neutral 
policy, which enabled it to depict itself as a fair mediator between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.128 In April 1991, Turkey’s ambassador to Moscow, Volkan Vural, 
visited Armenia as the first official Turkish representative and both sides admitted 
the need to overcome the regrettable memories of WW I.129 But after Armenians’ 
massacre on Azerbaijani civilians in the Karabakh town of Khojaly in late February 
1992, Turkey soon adopted a more pro-Azerbaijani attitude. In this context, it should 
be noted that Ankara refused to set up full diplomatic relations in part due to 
Armenia’s war with Azerbaijan, but also because the Armenian government did not 
acknowledge its borders with Turkey, thus keeping in reserve potential territorial 
claims on Northeastern Turkey.130 
Turkey takes into account peace, stability, and collaboration in the Caucasus 
of supreme importance. For that reason, it puts forth every attempt to solve current 
conflicts and to soothe conflicts in this area. Especially, while the Azerbaijani-
Armenian argument over Nagorno-Karabakh remains unsettled and is a cause of 
serious concern for the Turkish people. In this context, Turkey supports UN Security 
Council resolutions and the OSCE/Minsk Peace Process and considers the 1996 
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OSCE Lisbon Summit main principles laid down by   the   Statement   of   the   
OSCE Chairman-in-Office as an important basis for a solution.131  
While some leaders in Armenia have invited all parties to move beyond past 
detestation and contemplate on future opportunities, they have not won through. 
Those politicians who encourage old injuries and prefer a close alliance with 
nationalist components in Russia have continued their influence. Despite the fact that 
the Turkish-Armenian border remains closed, Turkish products enter Armenia via 
Georgia.132 Both Turkish and Armenian businessmen are eager to look to the future 
rather than think about the problems of history. Commercial relations will not 
prosper until political relations are set up. According to Ankara, relations will not 
return to normal until the Armenian government sincerely relinquishes territorial 
demands on Turkey’s eastern provinces. Another condition is that Yerevan should 
use its influence and force the Karabakh Armenians to depart from territories 
occupied in Azerbaijan beyond the debatable enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.  
3.4. Turkey and Azerbaijan 
Despite its limited size and small population, Azerbaijan, with its huge energy 
resources, is geopolitically vital. It is the gateway to Central Asia and the 
independence of the Central Asian states becomes nearly insignificant if Azerbaijan 
becomes fully subordinated to Moscow's domination. The future of Azerbaijan and 
Central Asia is also critical in determining what Russia might or might not 
become.133 
                                                                                                                                          
130 Svante E. Cornell, “Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh: A Delicate Balance”, Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.1, (January 1998) pp.61-62 
131 “Foreign Policy of Turkey: The Goals and Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy”, Official 
Declaration of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at internet. 
 Available at http://www.byegm.gov.tr/REFERENCES/for-pol-98.htm 
132 Paul B. Henze, “The Lands Of Many Crossroads: Turkey’s Caucasian Initiatives”, Orbis, Vol.45, 
No.1 (Winter 2001) p.87 
133 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, (New York: Basic Books, 1997) pp.46-47 
 38 
The close ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious, and historical links between 
Turkey and Azerbaijan are well known.134 Turks consider Azerbaijanis as first 
cousins, and their languages are mutually comprehensible. The fact that the majority 
of Azerbaijanis are Shi'ite Muslim while most Turks are Sunni has not diminished 
the friendly sentiments of both peoples for each other. And, Azerbaijani intellectuals 
were leaders in the renewal of Turkic nationalist awareness in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries and were always genially regarded by Turkish nationalists. 
After the Red Army put an end to Azerbaijan's independence, many Azerbaijani 
leaders settled in Turkey and the Soviet KGB used Baku as a base for subversive 
operations against Turkey for many years.135 A further influx of Azerbaijani émigrés 
had arrived in Turkey after World War II.136 Once Azerbaijan became independent, 
in 1991, the leaders of that republic instituted close relations with Turkey.137 
In the first period, Turkey favored Ebulfez Elcibey, leader of The Azerbaijan 
Popular Front (APF) and later President, whose foreign policy was pro-Turkish, pro-
Western, anti-Russian and anti-Iran. Having good relations with Turkey and the West 
made important sense from the point of Azerbaijan’s interests. However, because this 
policy was accompanied with pan-Turkist leanings, and included a hostility toward 
Iran and insensitivity to Russian interests, it damaged both Azerbaijan and Elcibey’s 
government. It created serious fears in Iran and Russia, and stimulated them to adopt 
a pro-Armenian stance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Also, Elcibey’s pro-
Turkish policy played a part in Russia’s resolution to replace him, because of 
Russia’s concern about the potential impact of actions in the Transcaucasus on its 
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own security and territorial integrity.138  Elcibey was overthrown in a coup in June 
1993 that brought Haidear Aliev back to power. Immediate reaction in Turkey, as in 
much of the world, was negative, since Aliev was thought to have been restored with 
Russian help.139 Criticisms both in Turkey and in the West analyzed Turkey’s failure 
to keep a friendly regime in power and keep its position in Azerbaijan.140 
At the beginning, Aliyev overturned some of his predecessor's pro-Turkish 
decisions, among them a very important oil deal. He also decided to join the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, hoping that Russia would take a more 
balanced position in the Azeri-Armenian conflict. After Aliyev returned to power, 
the Turkish president Demirel and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller emphasized the 
significance of good relations with Russia. In the meantime, the stress in bilateral 
relations moved more and more to oil-related issues, the transport of Caspian oil to 
the Mediterranean, the exploitation of the oil fields, and Russian oil deliveries to 
Turkey.141 But later Aliev established himself as an Azerbaijani nationalist and 
relations between both countries began to develop.142 Aliyev visited Turkey soon 
afterwards, from 8 to 11 of February 1994. On his visit, he came together with an 80-
person strong delegation, reflecting the importance he attached to closer relations 
with Turkey. President Demirel once more stated that Turkey would carry on 
backing Azerbaijan's "just claims" in the international fora. He sharply condemned 
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"Armenian attacks" and promised "help to our Azeri brothers in their efforts to 
rebuild a civil democratic state after seventy years of longing". Aliyev said he 
wanted to get back the lost area and that he was trying to get Turkey, the USA and 
Russia to end the war over Nagorno-Karabakh by nonviolent methods. "Azerbaijan 
lives only with its own soldiers and it will continue to do so... I consistently repeat 
that our Turkish brothers, our friends, should never doubt that we will ever, under 
any circumstances, give up the independence of Azerbaijan". Both leaders used the 
stock phrase "one nation, two states" to describe the links joining them.143 
It is a reality that the country that always expressed its backing for Azerbaijan 
is Turkey. In all international arenas Turkey has tried to explain and promote the 
Azeri view of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and has certainly been effective in 
preventing a pro-Armenian attitude from totally dominating these arenas.144 
Furthermore, Turkey and Azerbaijan both apply an embargo on Armenia, and Turkey 
refuses to normalize its relations with Armenia until it withdraws from the territories 
in Azerbaijan.145 But, Azerbaijan’s own foreign policy was restricted with the 
restrictions of US Freedom Supports Act section907a until 2002.146 But in spite of 
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this, President Aliev who sought Western engagement in his country in order to 
balance against Russian influence, viewed oil as a diplomatic lever. By bringing in 
mainly Western companies as partners, Aliev hoped to give Western countries - the 
US in particular - a concrete interest in the continued independence and stability of 
Azerbaijan. 147 
Despite the conditions that seemed to favor Turkey’s direct involvement on 
the side of the Azerbaijanis, Ankara has chosen to stay out of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict.148 In this regard, when Ankara’s policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan is 
examined, it is possible to perceive at least five factors that restricted Turkey, 
concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Firstly, the Kemalist principle of Turkish 
foreign policy prohibits any kind of adventurism abroad. Secondly, Turkey’s reliance 
upon US military aid and Turkey’s quest for full membership in the EU was 
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exploited by the US and EU, and they exerted pressure on Turkey not to involve 
itself on Azerbaijan’s side. Thirdly, Turkey has been unwilling to risk its relations 
with Moscow for active unilateral support to Azerbaijan.149 A fourth factor was the 
so-called Armenian issue: Ankara feared that any Turkish move to support 
Azerbaijan would be exaggerated by the powerful Armenian Diaspora in the West so 
that Turkey would be depicted as planning “new atrocities on Armenians”. In the 
fifth place, memory of the reaction it faced in Cyprus might have helped to calm 
down with other ventures. A last point is that Azerbaijan never officially asked for a 
Turkish intervention in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.150  
Among the Azerbaijani leadership, there is an understanding of Turkey’s 
difficulties. Yet, this is not to argue that the Azerbaijani leadership is satisfied with 
Turkey’s stance. Obviously, Turkey has lost a lot of its prestige in their eyes; 
However the Azerbaijanis are faced with the reality that, despite its limitations, 
Turkey is the only country it can be sure of as an ally against the Armenians, which 
should ensure the continuation of friendly relations between the two countries.151 
From Turkey’s point of view, it is important that it learnt some lessons from 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to support clearly Azerbaijan’s government and 
people: After Iranian warships and fighters attacked an Azerbaijani research vessel in 
August 2001, Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, the Turkish Chief of the General Staff, paid a visit 
to Baku and participated in the graduation ceremony of the first group of cadets from 
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the Turkish-run military academy, and confirmed Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan’s 
independence and territorial integrity. The air force supersonic acrobatic jets 
‘Turkish Stars’ displayed an air show that brought about half a million cheering 
Azerbaijanis to the streets of Baku - almost six percent of the country’s total 
population.152 Symbolic as these may be at the present, the gestures have long term 
objectives - hopefully conducive towards cooperation on more than one issue. 
3.5. The Energy Security Issue 
The world goes on oil and gas,153 and those who control it exercise 
commercial and geopolitical power.154 Besides, “oil is a magnet for conflict:” The 
problem is simple - everyone needs energy, but the resources of the world are 
concentrated in comparatively few countries.155 If military security is vital for 
maintaining the survival of states, economic security comes second which, in turn, 
feeds the former. In terms of economic security, energy security is of critical 
importance, because energy accelerates development. Therefore, it is an objective of 
states to secure continuous and cheap energy from diversified sources.156  
In this respect, the situation in the Caucasus has been complex. At the time of 
independence of Caucasian and Central Asian states, all of the pipelines were 
designed to supply the Soviet industrial heartland, and any exports to the West would 
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be through Russia and Ukraine;157 Turkmenistan’s gas export pipelines, Kazakhstan 
and Azerbaijan’s oil export routes all have to go across Russian territory before they 
can gain access to international markets. This monopoly is not limited only to the 
pipelines, but involves railways and even waterways.158 So most of the game consists 
of building alternative pipelines to Turkey and Western Europe, and to the east 
toward the Asian markets.159 For the Caspian oil and gas, the determination of the 
pipeline routes depends on various factors: the geopolitical interests of world powers, 
regional security matters, financial forecastings, the geographic status of major 
producers and existing infrastructure. Naturally, regional conflicts, discussions on 
export routes, political instability and the lack of regional co-operation slowed the 
development of Caspian oil and gas reserves.160 Until recently, Moscow’s policy has 
been aiming at jealously keeping the monopoly over all export outlets.161 
3.5.1. Caspian Region and the Oil Issue 
It is expected that continued economic growth in developed countries 
throughout the first decade of the 21st century will cause a substantial increase in 
demand for energy.162 The energy reserves of the Caspian Sea have provided the 
largest oil discovery for the end of this millennium.163 While the proven reserves of 
the Caspian region correspond to 3-4 percent of world reserves, the total reserves of 
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the region are 20 percent of world reserves.164 The confirmed reserves are about the 
same order of scale as around the North Sea: 16 billion barrels of oil and 8.3 billion 
cubic meters of gas, according to the US government.165 By 2010, Caspian region oil 
exports can reach 3.2 million barrels per day and gas exports 4,850 billion cubic feet 
per year.166 
Oil and gas reserves are valuable provided that they have access to markets. 
The Caspian region is at a disadvantage, because it has no direct exit to the high seas 
except the Volga-Don channel, which is frozen for half the year. This necessitates 
pipelines to transport the region’s oil to the markets. These pipelines must transit 
third states, which entails economic benefits for the transit states. Also, pipelines 
have a critical effect on degrees of control, dependency and influence for the 
producers and the transit states.167 In this respect, Caspian oil is among the most 
expensive sources of oil in the world. Whereas a barrel of Saudi crude costs about $3 
when reaching world markets, a barrel of North Sea oil costs approximately $10-12, 
and Caspian oil costs at an estimated $14.168 
In the years ahead, of course, the Gulf will remain the key about energy 
security for the world and also for Turkey:169 Because its oil is cheap to extract, the 
reserves are large, and there are significant existing and potential production 
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capacity. However, remembering the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, the US and several 
European nations now have strategic petroleum emergency supplies that could soften 
the waves of any embargo or interruptions.170 On the other hand, a long-drawn-out 
interruption in the stream of energy from the Gulf would bring about a dramatic 
escalation in oil prices and have destructive effect on the world economy unless, of 
course, the Caspian is cultivated.171 
The pipelines of the region can be summarized as follows:172 The present 
low-level Caspian production (“early oil”) is being carried by the existing pipelines. 
One connects Baku to the Black Sea terminal at Novorossiyk (northern route); a 
second one links Baku to the Georgian port of Supsa; a third goes from Kazakhstan 
oil field Tengiz to Russia’s Novorossiysk on the Black Sea coast (the Caspian 
Pipeline Consortium - CPC)173. The total capacity of all three is limited to about 
150.000 barrels a day (b/d). This will not be adequate when the development of the 
bulk of the Caspian reserves (“main oil”) is realized. Setting aside the Russian-
Balkan route, which is under consideration, and the Iranian-Persian Gulf route, 
                                                 
170 Also, 1973-74 oil crises have had a lasting impression on Turkish policymakers; since then, 
governments of all political parties have regarded energy to be vital for political stability, economic 
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states and took on a pro-Palestinian attitude on the Arab-Israeli conflict. See, Sabri Sayarı, “Turkey’s 
Caspian Interests: Economic and Security Opportunities”, in Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, ed., 
Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus, (Maryland: Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, 
2000) p.228 
171 Zalmay Khalizad, A Strategic Plan for Western-Turkish Relations, Report, MR-1241-SRF, 
(RAND: Santa Monica, Calif., 2000) p.83 
172 See, Appendix - Table 4. Oil Export Routes and Options in the Caspian Sea Region 
173 CPC comprises Russia, Kazakhstan, Oman, Chevron Caspian Pipeline Consortium, LUKARCO, 
Rosneft-Shell Caspian Ventures, Mobil Caspian Pipeline, Agip International, BG Overseas Holding, 
Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures, and Oryx Caspian Pipeline. TengizChevroil consists of US Chevron 
(50 percent), ExxonMobil (25 percent), Kazakhstan (20 percent) and LUKARCO (five percent). The 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium completed the 1,580-km (982-mile) link, for TengizChevroil, the 
consortium led by U.S. oil major Chevron which is developing Tengiz, and for the governments of 
Kazakhstan and Russia. The crude oil will be loaded on tankers from Novorossiisk and be transported 
into world markets through Turkey’s Dardanells and the Bosphorus straits. The first shipment crossed 
the Turkish Straits in June 2001.Tengiz alone contains six to nine billion barrels of recoverable 
reserves. Also, Kashagan, may contain 10 billion recoverable barrels or more, making it the largest 
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which is seriously opposed by the US, there are today three more or less equally 
feasible alternatives for transporting the “main oil” from the region to consumers in 
the West. One is to expand and renovate the northern route from Baku to 
Novorossiyk; the second is to construct new pipeline from Baku to Georgia’s Black 
Sea coast; and the third is to build a pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia to 
Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. This is called the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline.174 
All major oil companies have opposed the BTC as the main export route, for 
two reasons. (a) the inadequacy of reserves; and (b)its high cost compared to other 
possible routes.175 These economic obstacles seem to have lost some of their 
significance because of a number of developments. First, the objection of high cost 
was mitigated when Turkey arranged tariff reduction and guaranteed to cover 
construction costs above 1.4-bilion dollars. Second, objections based on 
insufficiency of reserves were diminished by the recent discovery of oil in 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan176. Third, in October 2000, Kazakhstan stated that it 
would support BTC by supplying 15 millions of crude oil.177 Fourth, it is estimated 
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175 In general, at the beginning of the1990s, many Western companies worried that investment in the 
Caspian region was unsafe. The new independent countries of the former Soviet Union were unstable, 
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in the region, especially between Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia. See, Daniel Yergin and Thane 
Gustafson, "Evolution of an Oil Rush," New York Times, (August 6, 1997) 
176 For more information on recent discovery of oil in Kazakhstan, see Joseph Fitchett, “Can Caspian 
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 48 
that the price of crude oil will become stable at around 20 dollars per barrel, and this 
will definitely affect the economic feasibility of the project.178 
The planned capacity of BTC is 45 million tons of oil annually (25 million 
tons Azeri and 20 million tons Kazakh oil). The 1730 km pipeline (468 km in 
Azerbaijan, 225 km in Georgia and 1037 km in Turkey) would, by AIOC179 
estimates, cost $2.4 billion. Actually, a direct line from Baku to Ceyhan could been 
shorter, however, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh and the lack of diplomatic 
relations between Turkey and Armenia left Georgia as the only practical option. The 
vulnerability of pipelines brought into debate of the terror-related risks in eastern and 
southeastern Turkey, but Turkey has given a guarantee about political risks, i.e. 
would contain any losses from an interruption in flow resulting from terrorist 
activities. Besides, Turkey has agreed to finance the cost, i.e. over $1.4 billion, of the 
portion of the BTC pipeline that would be built in Turkey.180 BTC oil pipeline is 
planned to be put into service at the beginning of 2005. Some 200 m dollars will be 
                                                 
178 Ali Karaosmanoğlu, “Turkey’s Objectives in the Caspian Region”, in Gennady Chufrin, ed., The 
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Company  Nation   Shares In AIOC (%) 
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invested in the BTC oil pipeline's planning and engineering work by mid 2002. 181 
Construction on the $3 billion project is set to begin in June 2002.182 
The BTC pipeline project is technically, economically and in terms of 
environmental security more convenient than other options.183 Compared to other 
routes, it presents a more secure investment situation, a potentially lower tariff 
(currently estimated at less than $3 per barrel), direct connection to large carriers in 
the Mediterranean, and access to the considerable Turkish and western European 
energy markets. The BTC line will also prevent heavy traffic on the Bosporus. Most 
important, the cooperative development of the BTC line will not only provides a 
dependable alternative to Russian pipelines, but also intensifies ties between the 
Caspian nations and the West.184 The US, whose strategic interests coincide with 
those of Turkey concerning the BTC project, began pursuing an effective policy in 
the Caspian region from the mid-1990s. The East-West corridor became a main 
concern for the US, particularly during the Clinton Administration. The American 
administration played a central role in laying the basis for the Ankara Agreement 
dated 29 October 1998. This was followed in November 1999, by the signing of the 
Istanbul Protocols at the Istanbul Summit of the OSCE, in presence of the US 
President. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey signed the Istanbul Declaration for the 
building of the Caspian-Mediterranean pipeline and all three governments have 
ratified this agreement.185 Turkey is energetically promoting the BTC project, and 
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in Russian 11.34 Gmt, (April 1, 2002) 
182 Owen Matthews, “The Next Move is Check” Newsweek International, (April 8, 2002) 
183 Şebnem Udum, “The Politics of Caspian Region Energy Resources: A Challenge for Turkish 
Foreign Policy”, Perceptions, Vol. VI, No.4, (December 2001- February 2002). 
Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/VI-4/sebnem.udum.htm 
184 Jan H. Kalicki, “Caspian Energy at the Crossroads”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, Issue 5, 
(Sep/Oct2001) p.124 
185 Şebnem Udum, “The Politics of Caspian Region Energy Resources: A Challenge for Turkish 
Foreign Policy”, Perceptions, Vol.VI,  No.4, (December 2001-February 2002). 
Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/VI-4/sebnem.udum.htm 
 50 
many Turks, especially the country’s political and military elites, have tended to 
view the BTC project as a matter of great national and international prestige.186  
Briefly, Turkey is bound to improve its cooperation with Caspian states for 
joint benefit in three main areas: as a customer for their oil and gas, as a partaker in 
their production of energy and, most importantly, as a country with a potential of 
unique access possibilities to Western markets.187 
3.5.2. The Natural Gas Issue 
It is estimated that Turkey’s necessity for electricity is forecasted to be 310 
TWh by 2010.Turkey’s main internal energy sources, that is to say fresh water and 
coal have potentials of 125 TWh/year and 105TWh/year correspondingly.188 Turkey 
is a net importer in terms of energy. It is 87 percent reliant on oil and gas for its total 
energy demand, and it imports 82 percent of the oil and all the gas that it 
consumes.189  
In contrast to its approach toward oil pipelines, the importance of gas supply 
for Turkey has caused it to pursue a policy toward gas pipelines that is driven far 
more by economics than by politics.190 Turkey has signed agreements with varying 
degrees of willingness to purchase new gas supplies from Russia191 (currently its 
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primary supplier), Turkmenistan192, Azerbaijan193, and Iran,194 all of which would be 
delivered primarily by new pipelines.195 Turkey represents the most promising target 
market for gas196 in southwestern Asia, and its potential suppliers are just as eager to 
supply their gas to Turkey, as Turkey wants to receive it.197 
                                                                                                                                          
Dzhugba on the Black Sea, then under the Black Sea for about 247 miles to the Turkish port of 
Samsun, and on to Ankara. When finished, perhaps by early 2002 (in May 2001, Botas said that 
Russian gas would start flowing through Blue Stream no later than February 2002), the Blue Stream 
lines will be the world's deepest undersea gas pipelines, and will necessitate complex engineering to 
build the pipeline (including a acidic environment due to high intensity of hydrogen sulfide at the 
bottom of the Black Sea). The two main companies engaged in Blue Stream are Russia's Gazprom and 
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possible gas supplies from Iran and, especially, Azerbaijan. 
193 Azerbaijan has keenly followed the Turkish gas market, securing a contract in March 2001 to 
export 2 billion cubic meters of gas per year starting in 2004 and more than 6 billion cubic meters per 
year starting in 2007. This agreement will directly benefit BP and other investors in Azerbaijan's 
offshore Shah Deniz gas field; these investors also plan to build a gas pipeline from Shah Deniz to 
Turkey along the same route as that of the BTC oil pipeline. See, Jan H. Kalicki, “Caspian Energy at 
the Crossroads”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80 Issue 5, (Sep/Oct2001) p.128 
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violation of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which imposes sanctions on companies investing 
more than $20 million in Iran's oil or gas industries. For its part, Turkey has persistently maintained 
that it needs to diversify its suppliers of natural gas away from Russia and that Turkmen and Iranian 
gas represent economically good options. See, Turkey, US Energy Information Country Analysis, 
(July 2001). Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkey.htm 
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Yemen. See A. Necdet Pamir, “The Geopolitics of Tile Caspian Resources: Turkey and the Big Power 
Struggle”, Paper presented to the conference "Natural Resources and National Security Policy" co-
sponsored by J1NSA, the U.S. Army War College, and in Cooperation with the Heritage Foundation, 
(May 8, 2000), Washington D.C. 
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to support all of the platform projects in the close time, say to 2010. See, Thane Gustafson, "Energy, 
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The $3 billion Blue Stream project represents more than a challenging 
engineering achievement. A powerful combination of Turkish and Russian 
politicians and business interests pushed the project through. Its success would 
represent a setback to American efforts to limit Russia's influence in region. The 
pipeline will increase Turkey's dependence on Russian natural gas from the current 
66 percent to around 80 percent.198 Gazprom has three main objectives regarding the 
Blue Stream project. The first is to eliminate third-party transit issues - such as 
Bulgaria and Ukrainia. The second is to the capture attractive and dynamic gas 
market of Turkey. The third objective is to block the East-West flow to make sure 
that the Turkmen gas is actually reserved for Gazprom and to block Turkey's role as 
an East-West transit corridor for gas. The last thing Gazprom wants is an alternative 
channel to its main back yard which remains the Western European market.199 But, 
heavy reliance on Russian gas transportation200 is particularly dangerous for Turkey 
in light of Moscow's recent coercive behavior.201 For example, it has sold gas to 
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Georgia at excessive rates and then stopped the supply on several occasions, in clear 
attempts to press that country to cooperate on various issues such as military action 
against Chechen insurgents.202 Initially the US opposed the Blue Stream project, but 
later it refrained and cautioned Turkey against relying too heavily on Russia and also 
warned that the Blue Stream endangered the Turkmenistan pipeline.203 
By supporting both the Blue Stream and Trans Caspian proposals, Turkey has 
sent complex signals about its policy objectives. Moreover, given the strong US 
support of the Trans-Caspian route, Turkey’s new gas deal with Russia produced 
tensions between Turkey and Washington when Turkey relies on sustained US 
backing for the BTC project.204 This might have been a deliberate policy move to 
integrate with the Russian Federation on a serious economic move as well as one of 
the expectations about Turkmen-Azerbaijan bickering about virtual price.205 
3.5.3. Security of the Turkish Straits 
At present, the AIOC pipelines and the CPC pipeline carry Caspian oil to the 
Black Sea, and from there the oil arrives at markets through the Turkish Straits. But, 
the Straits, mainly the Bosphorus, is already not capable of handling the heavy flow 
of tanker traffic due to its geophysical restrictions206 - and this traffic will increase as 
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more Caspian oil comes on line.207 First of all, tanker vessels pose an environmental 
danger.208 But, this threat is relatively modest compared with a fully laden tanker 
accident209 close to an urban area.210 Also, the tankers that would pass through the 
Turkish Straits are subject to tonnage211, size and width limitations.212 
The 1936 Montreux Convention provides free passage of trade vessels 
through the Turkish Straits and makes no ecological stipulations. The size and speed 
of the vessels increased since 1936 and capacity of the traffic has grown 
significantly.213 Besides, the concept of security has changed a good deal since the 
1930s. So, coastal states, while trying to put in order freedom of passage and 
navigation, also take into account the security of the lives and property of the people 
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VI, No.4, (December 2001-February 2002). 
Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/VI-4/sebnem.udum.htm 
209 According to Turkish figures, nearly 45,000 vessels go through the Straits each year, and there are 
numerous accidents. The Bosphorus observed 167 large-scale accidents in the decade between 1983 
and 1993, with the average annual rate of accidents having increased 35% since 1988. See, Bülent 
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Security of the Caspian Sea Region, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p.155 
 55 
living in the area214 and of the environment. All developments in the Law of the Sea 
Convention215 concerning the safety of the vessel, of passage and navigation, and the 
protection of the environment should be fully regarded while regulating passage and 
navigation by legal norms. Turkey was not only being authorized due to the security 
principle preserved in the introduction of the Convention, but also by the general 
principles of the Law of the Sea. Indeed, Turkey took those points into consideration 
while endorsing the 1994 and the 1998 Maritime Traffic Regulations (MTR)216, 
which have international implications.217 With the support of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) and the international community, Russia grudgingly 
accepted the MTR, and the diplomatic skirmish remained minor218 
3.5.4. Status of the Caspian Sea 
Current debates concentrate on the matter of whether the Caspian is a sea or a 
lake. If the Law of the Sea Convention219 were applied, full maritime borders of the 
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five littoral states220 bordering the Caspian would be established at the base of 
equidistant division of the sea and undersea resources into national sectors. However, 
if the Law of the Sea were irrelevant, the Caspian and its resources would be 
developed together.221 
If a body of water is not a "sea" and thus not regulated by the U.N. 
Convention, then by supposition it falls under the categorization of a "lake." While 
no international convention identifies the term "lake" or institutes a rule for dividing 
such a body's resources, precedent has established that those countries which border 
on a lake are to separate its resources equally between them, as the case of the 
American Great Lakes on the U.S.-Canada border and with Lake Chad in Africa.222 
The recent position of the five littoral states can be outlined as follows: while 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan seem to have a similar comprehension over the 
division of the seabed223 – dividing it into national sectors according to median line – 
Iran is demanding the sea’s division into five equal parts (both the seabed and the 
surface of the sea); Turkmenistan frequently changes its view, but is generally closer 
to the Iranian attitude.224 This is one case where Turkey has no say, and one that 
                                                 
220 Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Iran and Russia,  
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presents a handicap for its foreign policy outside its control. Yet it is an affair that 
implicates Turkey’s room for maneuver.  
 
3.6. Turkey: Towards a Stronger Regional Power 
 3.6.1 The Changing Character of World Affairs and its Impact on 
Turkey 
All through the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy has been described by two 
principles: an unequivocal orientation toward the West and to avoid extra-territorial 
interests or activities extending beyond the country's borders.225 In this period, there 
was a consensus in the Western Alliance on the significance of Turkey: Turkey tied 
down some 30 Soviet divisions, prevented possible Soviet attacks against Western 
Europe and the Persian Gulf, and functioned as an important area for monitoring 
Soviet compliance with arms control agreements.226 On the other hand, Turkey's 
relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus were almost absent despite common 
ethnic and cultural ties; moreover Moscow tried to diminish contact between Turkey 
and the Turkic peoples under its rule.227  
The end of the Cold War has had major impacts on global and regional 
politics. In the 1990s, all states, large and small, sought to adopt to the new 
international realities.228 In light of developments of the 1990s, Turkey perceived that 
it possesses a unique advantage that only major powers in world politics have. 
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Namely, it can play a significant role in many regions as well as in trans-regional 
issues such as energy security and weapons proliferation.229 It must be mentioned 
that US backing for Turkey's activist policy in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the 
Caucasus also played a fundamental part in this change.230 
Turkey’s activism represents a trend resulting from structural factors in 
Turkey's domestic, regional, and international environment and, as such, this trend is 
likely to grow in the years ahead. First of all, Turkish officials were concerned about 
their country's geo-strategic importance to the West. These concerns were intensified 
by Europe's unwillingness to admit Turkey as a full member of the EU. Also, the 
conflicts and problems in its neighborhood prompted Ankara to become involved in 
these regions. The leadership of Turgut Özal, whose residence in office from 1989 to 
1993, proved to have a permanent influence on Turkey's activist and assertive 
policies during the rest of the decade. 231 The role of public opinion in the evolving 
concerns of security elites was also an important change.232 The other reasons for 
Turkey's greater activism are: more success in economics; a better-equipped and 
more experienced armed forces; the decline of neighboring states;233 greater regional 
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233 The collapse of the Soviets has boosted Turkey’s security in many areas: for example Syria and 
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chance; and a greater sense of policy independence marked by the ending of risks 
forced by the Cold War.234  
In these circumstances, the role of Turkey’s elites’ was decisive; they were 
aware of changing post-Cold War, conditions and Turkey’s potential for influencing 
the political development in crucial areas - such as the Caucasus, Middle East, 
Balkans, and the Black Sea region. Even more important is the growing political 
determination among Turkey’s leaders to take the opportunity to fortify the NIS 
countries political influence in the region.235  
Another factor that has heightened Turkish security concerns was anti-
Turkish alliances. In the late 1990s, growing military cooperation between Armenia 
and Russia, including the shipment of S-300 missile system and advanced MİG-29 
fighter jets to Armenia was critical. The military build-up of Armenia and the 
growing Russian military presence close to Turkish borders was perceived as a 
potential threat.236 In actual fact, the Russian military never departed Armenia. The 
Armenian government has constantly welcomed them as a convenient deterrent, not 
only for Azerbaijan but also against Turkey.237 In the same direction Greek, 
Armenian, and Iranian rapprochement attracts attention; Greek, Armenian, and 
Iranian foreign ministers have came together trilaterally on an annual basis since 
1995; though they have not announced any common anti-Turkish undertakings, 
Ankara naturally sees this combination as undoubtedly unfriendly.238 
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3.6.2. Turkey’s Objectives 
Indeed, compared to the Cold War years, Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s 
was significantly more activist and self-confident. However, this did not mean 
abandoning moderation and caution that has traditionally described Turkey's 
approach to international and regional affairs.239 Turkey was not severing but 
redefining its relations with Western Allies, while reaching out for a broader 
Eurasian role as well.240  
For Turkey’s part, the first striking evidence of the change in foreign policy 
became obvious during the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis as Turkey took a dynamic role in 
the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq.241 Özal stated at a 1991 post-Gulf War press 
conference that Turkey "should leave its former passive and hesitant policies and 
engage in an active foreign policy."242 Özal was convinced that Turkey had 
innumerable opportunities that allowed it to assume a more powerful position in 
foreign affairs.243 In subsequent years, İsmail Cem explains this approach as follows: 
“We are [Turkey is] a multi-regional power, dealing with several geographic 
areas.”244  
Turkey regarded Caspian energy development as crucial to the regional 
rivalries between Russia, Iran and Turkey in the Caucasus triangle. Additionally, 
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Turkish officials assumed that Turkey's emergence as the crucial link in the proposed 
East-West energy corridor would promote its strategic importance to Europe and the 
US. To achieve its objectives, Turkey sought closer political and diplomatic relations 
with the energy-rich Caspian states, particularly with Azerbaijan.245 The corrosion of 
Russian military that was apparent in the Chechnya war according to Turkish elites 
encouraged them that Turkey could play the role of a more powerful regional actor in 
the Caucasus. After that point, Turkey and Russia began to struggle for influence in 
energy pipelines routes from the Caucasus and Central Asia; for instance, the issue of 
involvement in “ethnic” problems is an extension of power struggle in the Caucasus, 
however mitigated by the early 21st century.246  
Mainly the energy subject is regarded as a major motivation of Turkish policy 
for economic considerations.247 It is true that the collapse of the USSR and the 
independence of its 15 successor states have provided Turkey opportunities. Turkish 
engagement in post-Soviet Eurasia has brought substantial benefit to the Turkish 
economy in addition to enhancing Turkey's geo-political significance and prestige.248 
But, actually, Turkey’s primary long-term objective is political - formation and 
preservation of a pluralistic Eurasia which is open to the West in general and to 
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Turkey in particular.249 İsmail Cem explains this as follows: “Contemporary Turkey 
aspires to be the leading economic and political actor in Eurasia.”250 
In reality, this is a part of a broader plan, which is envisaged at the Long-term 
Strategy, and Eighth 5-Year Development Plan of 2001-2005: 
Our country is at the center of the Eurasia whose strategic and 
economic importance will increase in the 21st century. This region offers 
chances for Turkey to reveal its real economic potential and to be a more 
influential power center. Historical and cultural ties with Turkish republics, 
including Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, are of significant 
advantages. In this context, creation of new attempts and to achieve certain 
points at continuing collaboration with regional states is very important... 
With consequences of developments in social and economic areas, cultural 
features, and its geostrategic location, Turkey aims to increase its influence 
as a regional power at the 2010s and be a global power in the 2020s. Turkey 
has the capacity to achieve these objectives with its existing properties.251 
The 57th Turkish Coalition Government Program supports these long-term 
objectives: 
Turkey's traditional strategic importance and weight has become all the 
more pronounced as a result of recent developments in the Balkans, 
Caucasia, Central Asia, the Black Sea, Mediterranean region and the Middle 
East. Turkey is now the key player in this axis, which might be called the 
process of ‘Eurasianization’. Our government is resolved to make use of the 
opportunities and responsibilities of this position of our country to the 
benefit of our nation.252 
 
Even if Özal's first vision of more activism in the Turkic world proved rather 
unrealistic, his policy and the effects it created did set the tone for Turkish policy for 
the rest of the 1990s. By 1993, it was commonly recognized that Turkey had a 
significant role to play in the southern flank of the former Soviet space. While 
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Turkey has not necessarily become the model, which the new states of the Caucasus 
and Central Asia seek, its thriving private sector, its secular attitude toward Islam and 
its (usually) well-functioning democracy continue to have its appeal in the region.253 
The 1998 crisis with Syria reflects Turkey's emergence as an assertive, self-confident 
power in its region, encouraged.254  
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CHAPTER 4 
4. COMPETITION in the CAUCASUS           
Russian–Western relations had severely worsened during the last half of the 
1990s. The growing crack was reflected in Russia’s National Security Concept, 
Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine.255 These documents stress nuclear 
deterrence and nuclear first use as the main feature of Russian security, a forceful 
conventional defense against nuclear first use,256 robust conventional defense, the 
military’s role in domestic conflicts caused by NATO, and the regular use of armed 
forces to cope with local, including domestic, conflicts.257  
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the Pratica di Mare Air Force Base near Rome. They signed the Rome Declaration, "NATO-Russia 
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Meanwhile, it seems as if a division is developing between two groups of 
states in the Caucasus. The first is the mainly a pro-Western group, proactive in 
foreign policy matters and is anti-Russian. In general, this group resists Iranian 
influence and seeks to minimize it, and the US mostly assists it. On the other side, 
there is a set of countries which show antipathy towards the increasing influence of 
the US and Turkey in the region and are in a conflictual situation with America’s 
allies.258 
Western-oriented states of the region, Azerbaijan and Georgia, perceive 
threats by a large, unstable and assertive Russia.259 As a response, both countries 
deepened their ties with NATO in the last several years. In institutional terms, a most 
significant factor, which is related with Azerbaijani and Georgian perceptions of 
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American power, is the importance attributed to NATO as an organization.260 While 
the Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze has forecasted that Georgia will be 
“knocking on NATO’s door” within five years261, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister, 
Vilayet Guliev, said that Azerbaijan plans to ask for candidate status in NATO in 
December 1999.262 Elements from Georgia and Azerbaijan are also joining in the 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) as part of a Turkish battalion.263 Also, In March 2001, 
Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Aabiyev and Foreign Minister Guliyev repeated 
that Azerbaijan should host either a NATO or Turkish military base on its soil to 
maintain equilibrium and strengthen its security against the Russian military 
presence in Armenia.264 
In reply, US officials articulate their grander outlooks of the future.265 
Strengthening the true independence of the Caucasian states has become an 
important policy objective for Washington with some of its NATO allies. That's why 
millions of dollars have been transferred to the Georgian military, but in the case of 
Azerbaijan, Turkey - the main ally of the US in the region - has taken the lead in 
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assisting in reorganization and bringing to NATO standards the Azerbaijani armed 
forces.266 Furthermore, US military attendance in the Caspian materialized for certain 
in 1999267 and the recent turns include the US’s lifting of a ban on selling arms to 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, and resulted in a military cooperation agreements between 
Azerbaijan and the US. They also contain the statements of US State Department 
officials as to their country's commitment to Azerbaijan's defense and security and to 
the development of Azerbaijan's military competence to meet any future Iranian 
military confrontation. In addition, the officials have stressed the US support for 
Azerbaijan in any future conflicts with Iran over the problematic oilfields.268 Now 
the US is posting forces in the region for the first time and sending military advisers 
to Georgia to wage war on terror.269 Of course, these kinds of issues are extensions of 
some strategic calculations between the US and Russia. 
4.1. Turkey’s First Rival in the Caucasus: Russia 
4.1.1.Strategic Calculations of Russia 
Today Russia has troubles about preservation of a political and military 
presence, increase of the control over extraction and transportation routes of the 
Caspian oil, struggles at eliminating potential geopolitical contesters, neutralizing the 
spread of Islamic fundamentalism and perceived Pan-Turkism, protection of the 
rights of the Russian population, and avoiding damaging influences on the situation 
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in the North Caucasus. Above all, there has emerged the issue of oil.270 Nevertheless, 
during its history, Russia has tended to evaluate itself against other nations and races 
along with other powerful countries. Apparently this trend is still part of Russian 
policy-making. Russia is trying to return to its hegemony, and is energetically 
competing for influence over its neighbors.271 
From the perspective of history, Russia has always recognized the Northern 
Tier and Turkey not only as a gateway to the marginal seas, but also as a possible 
occupation route to Russia. So, the Russians have always been acutely aware that the 
Caucasus is a very important strategic venue to their homeland.272 Accordingly, 
politico-military presence in the southern Caucasus would at a minimum help Russia 
to preserve and possibly expand its interests in Central Asia and the Black Sea 
region.273 Also Russia doesn’t want the Transcaucasus to serve as a buffer or barrier 
for Russia from the Middle East, which is a vital and important supplier of oil.274 
From 1993 on, Moscow increased its interest in the reintegration of the non-
Russian republics of the former Soviet Union.275 Explicitly, a clear Russian policy 
towards the South Caucasus developed based on three major principles. Firstly, the 
Caucasian states should be members of the CIS. Secondly, the external boundaries of 
these states were to be protected by Russia. Thirdly, Russian military bases should be 
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present on the territory of the three states.276 In company with its principles, Russia 
has pursued a three-branched security strategy in the southern Caucasus. 
Diplomatically, it tried to appear as a mediator or a peacekeeper in the regional 
conflicts.277 Militarily, Russia has pressed for the conclusion of bilateral agreements 
for the deployment of Russian troops and the establishment of Russian bases on their 
territories. Multilaterally, Russia sought to increase CFE Treaty’s sub-zonal limits 
that affect Russia’s northern Caucasus.278  
However, in diplomatic circles, Russia declared its apprehension about 
NATO and its PfP program279, which created concerns about presumable NATO 
plans for enlargement to the south.280 Turkey's status as a NATO ally attained real 
significance considering the fact that the US is its major ally.281 It must be 
remembered that Russia's new draft military doctrine suggests that Moscow will 
menace even WW III if there is Turkish intervention to the disadvantage of Russian 
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interests,282 yet the new Russo-Armenian and Azeri-Turkish treaties imply just such 
an option.283  
From a global perspective, Russian stakes in the Caucasus region is clear. For 
example, soon after the 26 March 2000 election, Russia’s National Security Council 
declared the Caspian region to be one of Russia’s key foreign policy interests.284 
Despite the fact that Russia has some ecological interests285 in the Caspian region, 
geo-political importance of the region is of utmost importance. Because, geo-
politically, Russia is conscious that the retention of Russian influence within the 
space of the former Soviet Union will directly determine the future of Russian 
statehood. Caspian oil, despite all its economic significance, is just the external 
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manifestation of the global political task of the present day - restoration of Russia's 
power.286 Some circles in Russia articulate one of the clearest examples of this 
outlook. According to them, in line with Caucasian politics, destabilizing the 
political situation in the Near Abroad287 would be more useful for Russia than 
allowing strengthening of the NIS in the Caucasus and the Caspian littoral, perceived 
to be unfriendly to Moscow.288 As a logical extension of this approach, Moscow 
supported Armenia and gave privileges, such as a 25-year military base agreement 
and control of the border. It has argued that these are necessary to protect Armenia 
from Turkey.289 All the same, given Ankara's opposition to a re-establishment of 
Russian military, political, and economic supremacy in the area, Russian and Turkish 
stakes are certain to clash in the Transcaucasus.290 
4.1.2. Relations between Turkey and Russia after the 1990s 
When CIS Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, expressed 
that Turkey’s taking part in the Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan related to Armenian-
Azerbaijani conflict would cause World War III, it became clear that at least in the 
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short term, Russia was more powerful than “brother” Turkey in the Caucasus and 
Center Asia.291   
After this problematic era, Turkish-Russian relations arrived at a 'Golden 
Age'. In this Golden Age, the evolving image of Russia as a power was no longer 
dominated by territorial and ideological expansionist ambitions. This optimistic 
depiction of Russia does not mean that Turkey's traditional apprehensions have been 
completely eliminated.292 Despite the fact that Turkey no longer shares a border with 
Russia, Ankara continues to perceive Moscow as a geo-political competitor and 
source of regional risk.293 
4.1.2.1.Economic Relations 
Cooperation rather than competition has dominated the economic sphere in 
Turkish-Russian relations. Both sides showed resolute political will to expand its 
boundaries.294 Derived from the principle that interdependence promotes security, 
Turkey initiated the project of Black Sea Economic Cooperation in 1990. The project 
turned into a formal organization (OBSEC) in 1992.295 Later, Russian-Turkish 
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economic relations developed. The private sector on the Turkish side, and private oil 
and gas companies on the Russian side, urged cooperation between Turkey and 
Russia.296  
Afterwards, Turkey’s growing activism, and Russia’s considerable loss of 
power after the cold war, has made the two states more cooperative in dealing with 
each other on the basis of equality. Each today has a strong economic concern with 
the other.297 For example, the official trade capacity has more than multiplied by two, 
from $1.9 billion in 1992 to $4.1 billion in 1997, with unofficial trade worth several 
billion dollars more. In buying some $2.1 billion worth of merchandises from 
Turkey, Russia was the second main market for official Turkish exports to other 
countries. Russian’s current economic problems are discouraging against 1998 
bilateral trade statistics, but Turkey is expected to hold its comparative economic 
importance to Russia.298 Thus, Ankara has a strong economic motivation to keep 
relations with Russia. 299 Süleyman Demirel expressed this relation as follows: 
 The Turkish Russian relationship is important in the new landscape of 
international relations.  Turkey has become the second ranking trade partner 
of the Russian federation and we regard the cooperation of that country to be 
essential politically and economically. From our point of view, the giant trans-
frontier projects of energy and infrastructure that we pursue, underpin not a 
rivalry but a joint effort in rendering our region richer, integrated and thus 
peaceful.300 
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More to the point, the argument in favor of the Blue Stream project was that it 
would help control Turkish-Russian rivalry in the Caucasus and the Black Sea.301 
According to this analysis, Turkey and Russia are two giant neighbors that would 
gain from cooperation instead of regional rivalry. For example, to underline the 
significance of the new partnership, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin declared after the 
signing, "No more Chechen and no more PKK problems."302 In fact, Russia seems to 
have used the Kurdish factor as a preemptive factor towards Turkey not only with 
regard to Chechnya but also with regard to entire the Transcaucasus.303 Russia has 
made clear that it is prepared to play the Kurdish card whenever Turkey’s own 
presence in the region creates problems for Moscow.304 
4.1.2.2. Managed Competition in the Region 
High-level exchanges between Turkish and Russian officials during the 1990s 
laid the ground rules and political obligations for improved collaboration.305 Today, 
diplomatic communication and regular political contacts are primary instruments for 
managing Turkish-Russian competition.306 
Threatened in modern times by the spread of Russian/Soviet power, Turkey 
has used two strategies. One strategy depended on forming coalitions with other 
Western powers to oppose Russian aspirations and defend Turkey. NATO typifies 
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that strategy. The second strategy accepted a wide spectrum of cooperative links with 
Russia.307 For Turkey, the most momentous characteristic of the termination of the 
Soviet Union was that, for the first time in history, it no longer shared a boundary 
with Russia.308 On the other hand, current Russian troop deployments in bordering 
Armenia and Georgia make Turks doubtful that Russia’s expansionist desires won't 
die easily and creates a legitimate cause of anxiety for Turkey. 309  
Turkey's foremost objective with the NIS is normal economic dealings. But 
Turkish diplomacy, concerning the NIS in the early 1990s, was motivated by the 
vision of connecting their newly liberated Turkic and Muslim "brothers" in 
Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and even the Russian Federation.310 Unfortunately, the 
rhetoric of “Turkic world” only provided to evoke Russian hostility for fear of “Pan-
Turkism” and “Neo-Ottomanism”311 and resulted in the concept of the near 
abroad.312 From today’s outlook, the new awakening of Turkey concerning its 
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international role invites a re-evaluation of Turkish-Russian interrelationships.313 It is 
true that Turkey seeks to preserve its friendship and strong economic ties with 
Russia. At the same time it pursues a robust, but controlled policy to spread Turkish 
influence in the Transcaucasia, the Black Sea, and Central Asia to form a zone of 
influence and keep Russia away from Turkey’s borders.314 While Turkey aspires to 
become a pivotal country in Eurasia, Minister Cem emphasizes one issue 
specifically: "We are not in a fight. We are in serious competition. We are in 
peaceful and rational competition…not only with Russia but all foreign countries in 
the region."315  
Due to the fact that the two countries continue to be locked in a competitive 
posture about Central Asia, the Caucasus, and energy issues,316 they carry on a 
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managed geopolitical rivalry.317 In this respect, managed competition symbolizes 
Russia's and Turkey's mutual assessments of each other as geopolitical competitors, 
especially regarding their role and influence in the southern part of the new Eurasia. 
In policy terms, this attitude has led to a behavior aimed at limiting the other's 
freedom of movement and long-term influence in the region as much as possible.318 
In tandem, the progress of relations in the 1990s can be captured by the term 'virtual 
rapprochement.'319 While this is less than a perfect state of affairs, it is still a highly 
acceptable relationship because it represents a break with the innate pattern of the 
past.320 
However, the same mental and psychological change has not occurred to the 
same degree in Russia. The Russian political elite seems to be caught in deeply 
hesitant feelings for and views of Turkey. Russia's weakness, Turkey's membership 
of NATO and the traditionally over-exaggerated perception of pan-Turkism as 
Ankara's strategy to break-up the Russian empire, add to fuel Russian 
ambivalence.321 For example, the construction of the Blue stream gas pipeline, 
according to some circles, is a certain argument proving Russia’s unchanged 
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psychology.322 According to this view, while there are serious technical and related 
environmental questions about the Blue Stream project, the real risk lies in fact that 
Turkey will almost completely be dependent on a single gas source, namely Russia; 
and Russia can manipulate it when Russia’s strategic interests are concerned.323  
Nevertheless, Turkey had learned one important lesson concerning its link 
with Russia. It was that too aggressive a foreign policy in the Caucasus was no more 
attractive in the 1990s given the risk of escalating direct confrontation with Russia.324 
Besides, Turkey is conscious that any destabilization and separation in the Caucasus 
may lead to a very long-term destabilization.325 Concomitantly, the best way to 
influence Russian behavior in a constructive direction is to persuade Russia to enter 
into cooperative relations as an equal partner. If it is crucial to include Russia in 
regional cooperative deals, it is equally important to take preventive measures to 
prevent it from controlling these deals.326 Also, there are good reasons in respect to 
why there should be a political rapprochement between the two countries. One, 
Turkey and Russia need to create a political dialogue for the benefit of stability in the 
region. Secondly, the absence of such dialogue creates problems in relations, which 
is otherwise flourishing in so far as the economy is concerned. That’s to say, 
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economy and politics should not be contradictory. And last of all, both countries are 
being courted by Western capital, which offers a historic chance to fortify economic 
and political interests. Indeed, both countries are now facing a Europe that however 
unwillingly, considers both as a part of itself.327 On the other hand, there isn’t only 
one but two rivals of Turkey in the Caucasus. 
4.2. Turkey’s Second Rival in the Caucasus: Iran 
In the Cold War period, Iran’s main strategic concern was the Persian Gulf. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it concentrated on the Caucasus, Central 
Asia and Russia328 and its northern policy has evolved into a coherent strategy. Three 
main facets of this policy are certain: First, concern over the materialization of an 
independent Azerbaijani state on its border; second, a dramatic advance in security 
relations with Russia; and third, an aspiration to influence the development of oil and 
gas resources in the Caspian Sea.329 A critical point about energy is that while Iran’s 
geographic location presents sufficient chance for influence over the region’s new 
resources,330 this location also makes it easier to compete with Turkey.331 
When the foreign policy of Iran toward the Caucasus is examined, it can be 
observed that it seeks to maintain its hegemony within the Iranian borders and limit 
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threats to its rule originating from abroad.332 However, Iranian policy has been very 
interesting and quite illogical for foreigners. While Shiite clerics govern Iran, 
Azerbaijan is the only other large country to have a Shiite majority population.333 
Essentially, given the militant Islamic rhetoric, Iran ought to have been the first 
country to rush to back the Azerbaijanis, fellow Shia Muslims, in their conflict with 
the Christian Armenians. But, nothing of this sort happened. Whereas Iran declared 
itself ready to mediate in the conflict, it has constantly sought to develop its relations 
with Armenia.334 This is because the Islamic Republic's Azerbaijan policy is dictated 
by pragmatism rather than ideology.  According to Iran, a strong, politically 
independent, secular, pro-Western and pro-American Azerbaijan is not in its interest. 
Iran’s territorial integrity could indeed be endangered if the 20 million Azerbaijanis 
living in Iran find a healthy Azerbaijan increasingly charming. Yet by developing its 
energy resources and emerging as a strong petroleum-producing country, Azerbaijan 
will enter into rivalry with Iran. 335 What's more, Iran is furious over the inroads that 
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the West, especially the US, is making into the Caspian region through Baku.336 In 
brief, Realpolitik decides the direction of foreign policy in Iran. Likewise, the 
relation of Iran with Russia is another area of the execution of the Realpolitik 
principles. 
 
4.2.1. Relations between Iran and Russia 
Russia and Iran are neighboring states and this reality helped them to shape 
their own foreign policies. After 1991, Tehran and Moscow began to identify their 
cooperation as “strategic”, each side considering the other as vital to its own national 
security, internal stability, and territorial integrity.337 Despite some areas of 
tension,338 the Russian-Iranian relationship proved advantageous to both countries 
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during the 1991-2000 period. From Russia’s standpoint, Iran (despite occasional 
problems with paying its debts) is a perfect arms client and market for nuclear 
reactors.339 It has also been an ally against US hegemony as Russian-American 
relations deteriorated, and in controlling Azerbaijan. At a time when Russia has not 
fully recovered from the August 1998 economic crisis, with its armed forces 
(especially its navy) very weak, having Iran as an ally makes outstanding diplomatic 
sense, since an independent Iran helps avert the US from fully dominating the 
Persian Gulf. From Iran’s point of view, Russia is a secure source of complex arms; a 
diplomatic ally at a time when the US has sought to isolate it, and an ally in helping 
to limit Azerbaijan’s possible irridentist threat.340  
Indeed, since the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow has viewed its relations 
with Iran as a demonstration of its own self-sufficiency. Also, Russia does not share 
US concerns regarding Iran in adjacent regional zones, but rather views Tehran as a 
strategic partner, especially in Central Asia and the Caucasus.341 Moreover, Moscow 
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views the maintenance of ties and cooperation with Iran, a state that has problematic 
relations with the West, as a method of ensuring that Russian interests in the Middle 
East and Caspian regions will be taken into account.342 In conjunction with the aim 
of making Turkey ineffective in the region, Russia and Iran support one another 
against Turkey, which results in some problems in Turkish-Iranian relations. 
4.2.2. Relations between Turkey and Iran 
NIS in the Caucasus and Central Asia, with few exceptions, have many 
common features from olden times; culture, religious conviction, and linguistically 
both with Turkey and Iran, although differing to some degrees.343 However both 
Turkey and Iran are primarily important geopolitical pivots. Turkey stabilizes the 
Black Sea region, has power over access from it to the Mediterranean Sea, maintains 
equilibrium against Russia in the Caucasus, presents a cure to Muslim 
fundamentalism, and serves as the southern flank of NATO. A destabilized Turkey 
would be likely to set free more violence in the southern Balkans, while facilitating 
the reimposition of Russian control over the NIS of the Caucasus. Iran, despite some 
destabilizing attitude toward Azerbaijan, similarly offers stabilizing support for 
Central Asia. It dominates the eastern shoreline of the Persian Gulf, while its 
independence acts as a barrier to any long-term Russian or US threat in the Persian 
Gulf region. Above all, both of them are occupied in setting up some degree of 
influence in the Caspian Sea-Central Asia region, taking advantage of Russia’s 
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withdrawal.344 Last but not least, the Turco-Iranian contention has taken the form of 
a contention between "models" - Turkey presenting a secular, Western-oriented 
democratic model, while Iran offers an Islamic, anti-Western posture.345 
At the operational level of politics in the region, Iran has been very realistic 
about its possibilities in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Seeing the unfeasibility of 
transporting the Iranian model to Central Asian countries,346 Iran has found a 
common cause in seeking to prevent Turkish influence from gaining too much 
ground in the region along with Russia. For Iran, which is mainly interested in 
stability - internal as well as external - on both sides of its northern border, accepting 
the return of Russian hegemony is preferable, if it contributes to stability, instead of 
increased Turkish influence. 347 In this respect, Armenia has become a logical part of 
the grouping, and actually a practical Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran partnership has 
emerged, whose main function is to neutralize Turkish influence.348 Also, Iran 
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perceives that Russia is a dependable ally, which can help to curb Azerbaijan's 
possible irridentist threat - perhaps most important of all.349 But, Turkey also has 
support on issues related to the Caucasus from the US. 
 
4.3. Turkey’s Unique Partner in the Caucasus: The US 
4.3.1. American Grand Strategy  
Certainly, it must be acknowledged that the USA remains as the only 
superpower.350 Its role in the world is unique and undeniable; in many respects, its 
influence is felt in every corner of the world. It seems that, in the years to come, 
while all other countries will confront global competition, the USA will maintain its 
leadership in world affairs.351   
From a global outlook, the question of access to the oil and natural gas of the 
Caspian Sea region is related to other important US geostrategic interests in 
Eurasia.352 The growing US involvement in the Transcaspian region is strategic and 
aims to improve US influence and not that of other states. It combines all the 
traditional means of power, superior economic potential, and military competence 
with a commitment to integrating the area more fully into the West in terms of both 
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defense and economics.353 To show its firmness, overtly, the US affirms that it has a 
vital interest in ensuring access to critical resources of the Caspian Basin.354 It also 
adds: “The US will not allow a hostile power to dominate any region of critical 
importance to our interests.”355  
On the other hand, while it may seem that China is a somewhat distant power, 
it very much is a part of the Caspian region.  In spite of the fact that there are some 
players, who aspire to be more independent in the international arena, such as 
Europe, Japan i.e., China has some unique features. By reason of its rapid 
development, China’s need for oil will be rising faster than any other country in the 
world in the next decades.356 China has proven politically durable, economically 
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dynamic, and increasingly confident in positioning itself for a leadership role in East 
Asia. From the American viewpoint, the US takes into account that its long-term 
military program in particular implies that Beijing wants to have the capability to 
achieve its territorial objectives, and constrain US power in the region.357  The other 
side of the coin is that China, which is a hostile power to dominate any region of 
critical importance to the US interests, is accepted as America’s major potential 
strategic rival in Eurasia by the US.358 
Concurrently, there are some other calculations about pipeline considerations. 
The Turkish route's westward route would supply the European market whose fuel 
imports will only grow by a million barrels per day in the next decade whereas that 
of the Asian market will increase by 10 million barrels per day.359 This explains the 
US policy of America-friendly pipelines: the US wants to control oil flow 
worldwide. Not for fear of need - it has enough on its own soil - but, as it turns out, if 
there is a new world conflict between great powers, it is essential to be able to 
control the energy of the adversary.360 In “Monopoly”, the Belgian writer Michel 
Collon stated: "If you want to rule the world, you need to control oil. All the oil. 
Anywhere." If the US controls the sources of energy of its competitors - Europe, 
Japan, China and other nations aspiring to be more independent – the US wins. This 
clarifies why pipelines from the Caucasus to the West have to be America-friendly 
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and not "unreliable", meaning Russian-controlled.361 In tandem, in 1992 the US 
Senator Robert Dole (Democrat, Hawaii) said that: "The Gulf War was a symbol of 
the American preoccupation for the security of oil and gas reserves. The frontiers of 
that preoccupation are advancing to the north and include the Caucasus, Siberia, and 
Kazakhstan."362  
To achieve its objectives, the role of the US in the Caucasus has passed 
through several periods since 1991. At first, Washington was not enthusiastic about 
affirming its influence in the region, accepting it as Russia’s sphere of control. This 
policy appeared from an insistent respect for the Soviet Union’s status as a 
superpower, but it also stemmed from a lack of information and plans concerning the 
Caspian region, and a lack of comprehension of American interest there. Generally, 
Washington controlled its policy by supporting the Turkish model for the NIS up-
and-coming from the Soviet Union, backing Turkey’s demand for influence there as 
well as independence of the NIS. However, by 1994-95, American policy was in a 
phase of change. The Azerbaijani oil resources were activating to influence the 
White House to discuss with the two parties of the conflict in a more equal way, 
while still recognizing Russia as a crucial power.363 Subsequent to the steady 
reappearance of Russian power in the region after 1993, and given the importance of 
the region's energy resources, the US made a strategic choice to opt for more direct 
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involvement, rather than leaving that job to regional allies such as Turkey.364 And US 
involvement across the entire the Transcaspian has gained speed since 1994-95 when 
Washington conclusively refused Russia's claims to an energy monopoly. In 
February 1995, Washington made the crucial decision to back pipelines running 
through Turkey, and not Russia.365 The revolutionary event was the war in 
Chechnya, which showed to US officials the real (conventional) military capabilities 
of Russia: it could create substantial amounts of trouble, but not meet a serious 
military challenge. Namely, much of the US respect for Russia was lost. It is no 
coincidence that US policy in the Caspian became increasingly forceful from the 
second half of 1996, and the US has publicized that it considers the Caucasus and the 
Caspian as an area of ‘vital US interests’.366 By then, international financial 
institutions supported US policy and transferred sizable resources into the Caucasus 
to move them toward free markets and democratic governance.367  
Today US policy in the Caucasus is matured and it articulates that it has five 
main foreign policy interests in the Caspian region: (a) The independence and 
sovereignty of the NIS and their democratic and market development; (b) Promotion 
of regional conflict resolution; (c) The increase and diversification of world energy 
supplies; (d) Continued support for US companies and; (e) Continued pressure on the 
Iranian regime to change its unacceptable practices. 368  
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4.3.2. Relations between the US and Russia 
As far as the Caucasus is concerned, US policy has been very out of the 
ordinary. Although Washington states that it simply wishes to oppose any regional 
monopoly, it does not see the area as one for rivalry with Moscow.369 For instance, 
during the Clinton administration, the US strongly endorsed joint investments by 
American and Russian companies in the development of energy resources and 
transportation networks both within Russia and throughout the Caspian region.370 
This approach has offered economic motivations for Russian teamwork while giving 
the NIS access to about $100 billion over the next two or three decades. However, it 
has secured a major role for American firms in the region while consolidating US 
links with Turkey and the other Caspian states. Finally, it restricted Iran's regional 
influence at a time when that country's policies were mainly anti-American.371 
Former Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President and 
Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, puts it as follows: 
We seek to work with Russia as a partner in the development of Caspian 
energy resources. Our underlying goal is to build win-win situations for US 
and Russian companies and to get away from any tendency toward zero-sum 
thinking when looking at the region. Russian firms such as Lukoil and Central 
Fuels have already acquired shares of international consortia in Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan. We seek to encourage this sort of collaboration on pipeline 
and other Caspian energy projects, as the US and Russian Governments 
agreed during our last Summit meeting in Moscow. We even hope to see 
Russian companies gaining access to global markets by lifting their oil onto 
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supertankers in the Mediterranean via a commercially competitive BTC 
pipeline.372 
 
In conjunction with its Caucasus policy, the US is endeavoring to play a more 
assertive role in the resolution of armed conflicts. But it has a hard task, since Russia 
perceives the Caucasus to be within its sphere of influence.373 From a realistic 
approach, political resolve for any of the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian wars, 
appears to be far from accomplished if Russia’s role is minimized.374 On the other 
hand, as stated by Russia, also international organizations will not be able to present 
any security structure for the Caucasus or even to offer a structure for conflict 
resolution either. They are rather accepted as vehicles for diffusion into the region 
for such real players as the US, and Turkey.375 So, at that point, for materialization of 
US objectives, Turkey appears as a regional actor who is acting on behalf of its 
interests as well as American interests – of course acting as an independent state, not 
as a “US satellite”, as had been maintained by some Russian circles previously. 
4.3.3. Relations between Turkey and the US  
US policies toward Turkey are mostly determined by strategic concerns and 
by the acceptance of Turkey’s role in protecting vital American national interests.376 
                                                 
372 Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for 
Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, Address to CERA Conference, (Washington, DC, December 7, 
1998). Available at ttp://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/981207_mrngstar_ceraconf.html 
373 Elkhan E. Nuriyev, “The Ongoing Geopolitical Game in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin: 
Towards War or Peace?”  Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies; Monterey Institute of International 
Studies Available at http://cns.miis.edu/cres/nuriyev.htm 
374 Stephen J. Blank, US Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia, (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, June 2000) p.29 
375Pavel K. Baev, “Can Russia Do It Alone in the Caucasus?”, Perceptions, Vol.2 No.3 (September-
November; 1997) Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/ll3/II3-11.html  
376 Sabri Sayarı, “Turkish Perspectives toward German and US Foreign Policy”, Conference Report 
on The Parameters Of Partnership:  Germany, the US and Turkey- Challenges for German and 
American Foreign Policy, (Washington: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The 
John Hopkins University, October 24, 1997) pp.40-41 Available at 
http://www.aicgs.org.publications/PDF/turkey1.pdf). For example, Turkey is supposed to be one of 
the pivotal states along with Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa India, Pakistan, and 
Indonesia. See, Robert S. Chase and Emily B. Hill, “Pivotal States and US Strategy: The New 
 92 
As İsmail Cem put it, “It would be a correct assessment to say that the understanding 
between US and Turkish foreign policy is not just a matter of ideals; it is deeply 
rooted in realities and interests.”377 
However, the Turkish-American rapprochement began soon after WWII. In 
April 1946, the US warship SS Missouri arrived in Istanbul. That visit is often quoted 
as the symbolic event indicating the start of this bilateral strategic relationship. 
Although the US was backing Soviet demands to revise the Montreux Agreement 
governing the status of the Turkish Straits in late 1945, the situation changed when 
USSR made demands for bases on the Straits and on territories, two Turkish 
provinces bordering the USSR. It was only when the US came to regard the USSR as 
an expansionist power that Turkey's geo-strategic meaning became a precious asset 
for US policy. Subsequent to SS Missouri's visit, US-Turkish relations took off and 
Turkey became a beneficiary of both the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the Marshall 
Plan launched the following year.378 Subsequently, especially with Turkey's 
contribution to the Korean War on the side of US-led UN helped Turkey's 
membership to NATO in 1952. During the Cold War decades, the two countries 
developed a close strategic relationship. Turkey provided critical base facilities for 
the US military for strategic advantage toward the Soviet Union while the US 
provided economic and military aid to Turkey.379 However, the relationship, with the 
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exception of the 1950s and early 1960s, has been flawed with difficulties and 
resulted in Turkish mistrust of American friendship and intent.380  
Today, like many other analysts, Turkish analysts believe that the US is the 
only nation that really matters in global politics and that it only has the power, ability 
and political will to play a major role in regional issues that concern Turkey.381 From 
Washington’s perspective, Turkey remains an important ally with a strategic role in a 
variety of regional problems that concern American national interests.382 Even 
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though there are some contemporary areas of dispute,383 the alliance remains quite 
strong.384 Its multiple strategic functions are now widely acknowledged: a modest 
pro-western state in an unstable district; an exceptional, probably unique, example of 
democracy in a Muslim majority; an ideological counterbalance to Iran that tries to 
influence the area and even exports its Islamic revolution as written in its 
constitution; a barrier to potential reappearance of Russian violent behavior; a 
powerful but peaceful and anti-separatist supporter of the cause of besieged 
Azerbaijan Muslims in the region; an important non-Russian line of contact with the 
West and a potential opening for Caspian Basin energy supplies as an alternative to 
Russian and Iranian routes.385 Also, at the creation of this special relationship, like 
                                                 
383 See, Sabri Sayarı, “Turkish Perspectives toward German and US Foreign Policy”, Conference 
Report on The Parameters of Partnership:  Germany, the US and Turkey-Challenges for German and 
American Foreign Policy, (Washington: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The 
John Hopkins University, October 24, 1997) pp.33-44. Available at 
http://www.aicgs.org.publications/PDF/turkey1.pdf  Also for problems between Turkey and the US in 
post-Cold war era, see, Yasemin Çongar, “the State of Turkish-American Dialogue: Do You 
Understand What I’m Saying”, Private View, Vol.3, No.7, (Spring 1999) pp.40-46. Kemal Kirisci, 
“Turkey and the US: Ambivalent Allies”, Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney, eds., Friends of America: 
US Allies in a Changing World, (London: Frank Cass, 1999)  For example, Turkey had difficulties 
gaining entry to the US market for arms. In the U.S, there was increased focus on certain issues, such 
as the Cyprus conflict, human rights problems in Turkey, and Turkey's relations with Greece and 
Armenia, which created tensions with Turkey. These issues were also present during the Cold War 
years. But the vital role that Turkey played in the containment of the Soviet Union balanced the 
meaning of these other calculations and provided a strong direction and basis for strategic 
cooperation, counting the stipulation of security assistance and arms sales to Turkey. In the 1990s, 
with the absence of that broadly-understood threat, the relative importance of the other factors grew 
and had a negative effect on the execution of a strong, robust security cooperation between the US and 
Turkey. Zalmay Khalilzad, “Turkey's Strategic Relations with its Western Allies”, Conference Report. 
In a Conference on "The Changing Environment of Turkish Foreign Policy" organized by the Institute 
of Turkish Studies and held at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in February 2000 
384 On the strategic level, the two countries share mutual aims on many issues such as expanding 
NATO's membership, Turkish accession to the EU, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction or missiles, to the opening of new oil pipeline routes from the Caspian basin to the West, 
bypassing both Russian and Iranian territory. Kemal Kirisci, “Turkey and the US: Ambivalent Allies”, 
MERIA, Vol.2, No.4, (November 1998),  
Available at  http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue4/jv2n4a3.html 
385 Alan Makowsky, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy”, SAIS Review, Vol.19 No.1 
(Winter-Spring 1999) p.108 The US public rhetoric has affirmed Turkey's strategic significance in the 
post-Cold War era. In the earlier part of the Clinton administration, US officials stressed Turkey's role 
as a "front-line state" that is "at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the US on the 
Eurasian continent." See, Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 
statement before the House International Relations Committee, (March 9, 1995) Also former Deputy 
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott asserted that US-Turkish relations have "even more of a hardheaded, 
geopolitical, strategic rationale in the post-Cold War period than . . . during the Cold War." See, 
Speech by US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "US-Turkish Relations in an Age of 
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many other countries, Turkey realized that it must become active in US domestic 
politics; in this attempt, Turkey found an ally in helping its effort for energy subjects 
in the US, the energy companies. These energy companies perceive significantly 
commercial potential in Turkey’s growing energy requirements, including building 
facilities, and have generally been accommodating of Turkey and are strong 
supporters of Azerbaijan, where they process much of that country’s oil. These 
companies also encourage the BTC pipeline project. Both US and Turkey have 
zealously followed this policy to decrease the dependence of these countries on 
Russia.386 
At one of the intersection of regional cooperation, both countries perceive 
Russia‘s future as uncertain387 and the US support Turkey to “control” Russia. 
Besides, the US backs Turkey against the danger of significant expansionist 
incentives of Russia. On condition that Russia’s future is ambiguous, neither pure 
engagement nor containment is sufficient for the American line of strategy toward 
Moscow. Therefore, US and Turkey try to enhance military, economic and political 
relationships with Russia, but are also ready to complain about Russian disturbing 
characteristic of domestic and foreign performance more forcefully and are prepared 
                                                                                                                                          
Interdependence," delivered at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 14, 1998 
İsmail Cem summarizes Turkish-American collaboration as follows: “Obviously these geographical 
areas [the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia], together with Western Europe 
and the US, constitute the main focus of Turkey’s present-day foreign policy. They point to a huge 
space of mutual concerns and mutual interests for the US and for Turkey. In fact, they constitute our 
common agenda.” See, İsmail Cem, Turkish Foreign Minister, “Turkey-US: Cooperation for Regional 
Peace and Stability”, Insight Turkey, (April- June 2001) Vol.3, No.2, p. 156.  
386 Morton Abromowitz, “The Complexities of American Policy Making on Turkey”, in M. 
Abromowitz, ed., Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy, (New York: The Century 
Foundation Press, 2000) pp.169-170 
387 Turkey and the US perceive Russia ‘s future vague. Both of them evaluate the possibility of future 
domestic crises that could strengthen the centrifugal forces and destabilize itself and possibility of 
strong authoritarian leadership that could seek to restore its lost Empire; such kind of leadership that is 
aggressive and expansionist could threaten the Caspian Basin 
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to react to Moscow’s threats.388 As a sign of this policy, both allies make an effort to 
prevent Russian military power and its influence in the Caspian Basin.389 
As a continuation of Turkish-American cooperation against Russia, with 
regard to strategic concerns, both Turkey and the US recognize that the Caspian 
Basin is potentially unstable as a consequence of internal reasons in each of the key 
energy producing countries, threat of regional conflicts, and possible interference 
from outside the region. With the purpose of getting cooperation to ensure 
transportation safety for energy supplies from the Caspian Basin, the US is paying 
special attention to Turkish stakes in the security of the region and in the meantime is 
working to advance its political and economic interests. Consistent with security 
assessments, it is thought that Turkish military bases provide an outstanding position 
for defensive power to the Caspian Basin- together with the Persian Gulf; for 
example, both energy resources are within 1000 miles of Incirlik.390 Along with the 
US policy, at the Istanbul meeting of the OSCE in November 1999, the US played an 
instrumental role by supporting Turkey’s role in the area with American influence 
over the Transcaspian.391 
From a firmly business point of view, political and economic issues can have 
a direct effect on commercial considerations. From a broader view, pipelines can 
affect countries' internal development and external relations for years to come. The 
US, therefore, has a legitimate role in seeking to guarantee that the creation of 
Caspian pipelines helps achieve US foreign policy objectives with respect to the NIS 
                                                 
388 Zalmay Khalizad named this policy as “congagement”  
389 Zalmay Khalizad, A Strategic Plan for Western-Turkish Relations, Report, MR-1241-SRF, 
(RAND: Santa Monica, Calif., 2000) p.90 
390 Ibid, p.85 
391 Stephen J. Blank, US Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia, (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, June 2000) p.6 
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of the Caspian region.392 The US simply declared that when the full range of political 
and economic and commercial factors are taken into account, BTC provides a far 
better route, and is feasible.393  
Concurrently, BTC certainly remains an integral pivot in the development of 
Caspian energy resources. Turkey can play a stabilizing role in the unstable regions 
of the Caucasus. Encouraging Turkey to do so is important not only from the US 
foreign policy standpoint, but it is also critical for securing the huge investments 
made up until now and those under consideration by private companies.394 Moreover, 
the US continues to work closely with Turkey to help resolve the problems related to 
the transport of oil through the Bosphorus, including supporting the construction of 
an upgraded navigation system. The US is also looking at ways to develop new 
markets all through the Black Sea, which can absorb some of the Caspian's oil 
exports. The US continues to press Turkey to open its border with Armenia as part of 
its continuing, positive role in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.395 On 
the other hand, if BTC does not materialize, it will be a major setback for Turkey and 
                                                 
392 Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for 
Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, Address at Kent State University, (Kent, Ohio, November 23, 
1998). Available at http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/981123_mrngstar_caspian.html 
393 Rather than financing the BTC project directly (this would entail US taxpayers' subsidizing the 
operations of private oil companies and would be inappropriate and unfeasible from a domestic 
political perspective), the US is to function as a means with respect to financing these pipelines 
through the activities of US trade finance and investment agencies. For example, the US announced 
Caspian Sea Initiative, an exceptional effort by the US Government's three finance and investment 
agencies, the Trade and Development Agency (TDA), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC), and EXIM Bank, to coordinate their efforts to promote investment in energy projects 
throughout the Caspian region. See, Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Special Advisor to the 
President and Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, Address at Kent State 
University, (Kent, Ohio, November 23, 1998). Available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/981123_mrngstar_caspian.html Also, see, 
Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Caspian 
Basin Energy Diplomacy, Address to CERA Conference, (Washington, DC, December 7, 1998) 
Available at ttp://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/981207_mrngstar_ceraconf.html 
394 Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for 
Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, Address to CERA Conference, (Washington, DC, December 7, 
1998). Available at ttp://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/981207_mrngstar_ceraconf.html 
395 Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, Testimony 
before the US Senate, Foreign Relations International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion 
Subcommittee, (Washington, DC: October 23, 1997).  
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lessen Washington’s reliability in Ankara. This could weaken the strength of the 
bilateral relationship at least in that part of the world.396 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Available at http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/971023_eizen_caspian.html 
396 Sabri Sayarı, “Turkey’s Caspian Interests: Economic and Security Opportunities”, in Robert Ebel 
and Rajan Menon, eds., Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus, (Maryland: Rowman 
&Littlefield Publishers, 2000) p.242 
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CHAPTER 5 
5. CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey aimed at helping the region’s counties 
to become pluralistic democracies and respectful of the rule of law, progressing 
towards market economy, to adopt Turkey as a model for common advantage; and 
within this framework, to cooperate with each of these states in the fields of culture 
and economy and extend such cooperation gradually to the areas of education, 
security and other fields. By this way, in the long-run, Turkey planned to see these 
countries standing on their own feet, becoming completely independent of Russia, 
and establishing very close and trustworthy and deeply fixed relations with Turkey. 
Turkey also sought to establish cooperation in security affairs.397  
Concomitantly, the West (including the US)398 had backed the Turkish Model 
and this support was the main factor in determining the attractiveness of this 
model.399 From the NIS standpoint, they turned to Ankara as their principal 
middleman in integrating into the international political and economic system, 
expecting that Ankara's close ties with Washington would make it possible for them 
to receive US support in their efforts.400 To some extent, Turkey succeeded in 
establishing its presence in the Turkic republics, especially in Azerbaijan, and 
                                                 
397 “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Objectives”, Joint Proposals of Foreign Policy Institute on Turkey’s 
Current Foreign Policy Objectives, Foreign Policy, (Ankara), Vol. XVII, No.1-2, (1993), pp.14-16 
398 A former American political security officer in Turkey, Paul Henze of the Rand Corporation, first 
used the slogan “Turkish world from the Adriatic to the China sea”. See, Baskın Oran, “The Turkish 
Approach to Transcaucasus and Central Asia”, in Ole Hoiris and Sefa Yürükel, ed., Contrast and 
Solutions in the Caucasus, (Aarhus C.: Aarhus University Press, 1998) p.457, footnote.3 
399 İdris Bal “The Turkish Model and the Turkic Republics”, Perceptions, Vol.III, No. 3, (September-
November 1998) Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/lll-3/bal.htm 
400 Sabri Sayarı, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era; The Challenges of Multi-
Regionalism”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.54, Issue 1, (Fall2000) p.169. Available at Online 
Database of EBSCOhost with Item No: 3421448 
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economic and cultural connections between Turkey and the Turkic republics have 
increased considerably in the post-Cold War era.401  
However, earlier hope that Turkey would become the strongest political and 
economic partner of NIS has not become a reality.402 When Western information of 
the region and its economic, cultural and strategic matters increased, and new events 
took place. And the attractiveness of the Turkish Model or at least the backing of the 
West for this model weakened. Subsequently, the West and the US reconsidered their 
initial suppositions and policies and diminished their support for the Turkish 
Model.403 
Several factors have been held accountable for the relative decline of 
Turkey's regional objectives and its appeal as a model. The following reasons can be 
listed: First, after comprehending the real circumstances of the region, the West 
realized that although Iran had some geographic and strategic gains in the region, the 
effect of Iran in the region has been very limited and Iran’s policy was pragmatic 
rather than adventurist.404 Second, after the collapse of the USSR, when Russia 
initially gave priority to domestic affairs, it was assumed that there was a power 
                                                 
401 The increasing interest of the Turkish state in the region was indicated by the creation of the 
"Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) and the organization of annual summits 
including the presidents of Turkey and the Turkic Republics, the very first of which was held in 
Ankara in October 1992. Clearly, these efforts represented an attempt to institutionalize the 
relationship with these new sets of states. A "Turkish model" based on the country's logically 
successful experience of mixed economy, parliamentary democracy and early exposure to market 
oriented reforms was projected to the post-Soviet states as a handbook for their transition. See, Sabri 
Sayarı, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era; The Challenges of Multi-Regionalism”, 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol.54, Issue 1 (Fall2000) p.169. Available at Online Database of 
EBSCOhost with Item No: 3421448 
402 Sabri Sayarı, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era; The Challenges of Multi-
Regionalism”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.54, Issue 1 (Fall2000) p.169. Available at Online 
Database of EBSCOhost with Item No: 3421448 
403 İdris Bal “The Turkish Model and the Turkic Republics”, Perceptions, Vol.III, No. 3, (September-
November 1998) Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/lll-3/bal.htm On the other hand, 
many of the international firms that have subsidiaries in Turkey use these facilities for expanding their 
activities in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. In doing so, they benefit from both the lower cost in 
Turkey compared to European countries and from the easier entry Turks generally have to the new 
republics owing to linguistic and cultural affinities. See, Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey-The 
Challenge to Europe and the US, (Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2000) p.112 
404 See, Chapter 4 of this thesis 
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vacuum in the region. However, especially after 1993, Russia evidently declared its 
goal of regaining control over former Soviet territory, known as the ‘near abroad’. 
Third, the West inferred some Turkish policies and declarations of Turkish officials 
as indications of a re-emergence of pan-Turkism. Fourth, domestic problems such as 
the growth of Kurdish separatism and the challenge posed by the rise of Islamic 
forces in Turkish politics played a negative role in terms of the popularity of the 
Turkish Model and Western support for this model. Fifth, although the presidents of 
the Turkic Republics clearly stated that they would pursue the Turkish Model, after 
the realization of Turkey’s troubles; economic, political, ethnic and religious, they 
started to say that they wanted only the positive parts of the model. Furthermore they 
started to examine other models such as the Malaysian and Chinese.405 Sixth, Turkey 
overestimated the cultural and linguistic similarity with the NIS. Seventh, Turkey 
was preoccupied by other security concerns, such as threats from Syria and Iraq; 
instability in the Balkans; and, the worsening of relations with Greece over Cyprus 
and the Aegean. Eighth, Turkey was short of the economic means to provide the type 
of large-scale economic support and investment that the states in the region require 
and want.406 Ninth, the NIS was cautious of any type of domination by Turkey as an 
"elder brother". Last but not least, Turkey is a medium-power country and the new 
states could trade with the West directly for access to markets, arms, and technology, 
without using Turkey as a middleman. On the other hand, while Turkey was 
                                                 
405 İdris Bal “The Turkish Model and the Turkic Republics”, Perceptions, Vol.III, No. 3, (September-
November 1998) Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/lll-3/bal.htm 
406 F. Stephen Larrabee, “Türk Dış Politikası ve Güvenlik Politikası: Yeni Boyutlar, Yeni Güçlükler”, 
(Turkish Foreign And Security Policy: New Dimensions And New Challenges), in Işık Kuşçu, trans., 
Türk-Batı Ilişkilerinin Geleceği: Stratejik Bir Plana Doğru, (The Future of Turkish-Western 
Relations: Toward A Strategic Plan), (Ankara: ASAM yayınları, 2001) pp.29-30 
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presented as a democratic role model, all of these states have followed non-
democratic models, perhaps based more on the former USSR than on Turkey.407  
For Turkey’s part, the Caucasus represents a passage way and plays the role 
of a bridge for continuation of the relations between Turkey and the Central Asia 
states. Because of this reason, it is important to turn the Caucasus into an easily 
accessible bridge-way for Turkey’s communications with Central Asia and the 
Russian Federation. Concomitantly, in the face of an option of a revitalization of 
Russian expansionism, to renovate this region as a forward defense or a buffer zone 
for Turkey’s security interests is a vital consideration for Turkey.408 In line with 
these considerations, for Turkey, both Armenia and Georgia, which are located at the 
rim of the Caucasus bridge, are important. Turkey states that it wants to create a 
dependable friendship between Armenia and Turkey. For example, Armenia’s 
continuing weakness is the reason why this country is militarily dependent on Russia 
and economically dependent on Iran, both rivals of Turkey in the region. On the 
other hand, a Turkish-Armenian friendship would be a drastic blow both to the so-
called “Armenian Genocide” and to the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. Also Turkey 
will have no more problems like the alleged “Kurdish Republic of Lacin” in 
Nagorno-Karabakh.409 Alternatively, whereas Armenian attitude towards Turkey 
continues to become unfriendly, Georgia’s importance for Turkey is increasing. 
                                                 
407 Ziya Öniş, “Turkey and Post-Soviet States: Potential and Limits of Regional Power Influence”, 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) pp.68-69 For more 
information of the relative decline of Turkey's regional aspirations and its attractiveness as a model, 
see, Baskın Oran, “The Turkish Approach to Transcaucasus and Central Asia”, in Ole Hoiris and Sefa 
Yürükel, eds., Contrast and Solutions in the Caucasus, (Aarhus C.: Aarhus University Press, 1998) 
pp.452-467 Also see, I. P. Khosla, “Turkey: The Search foe a Role”, Strategic Analysis, Vol.XXV, 
No.3,  (June 2001) pp.343- 369  
408 “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Objectives”, Joint Proposals of Foreign Policy Institute on Turkey’s 
Current Foreign Policy Objectives, Foreign Policy, Vol. XVII, No.1-2, (1993), p.16 
409 See, Baskın Oran, “The Turkish Approach to Transcaucasus and Central Asia”, in Ole Hoiris and 
Sefa Yürükel, ed., Contrast and Solutions in the Caucasus, (Aarhus C.: Aarhus University Press, 
1998) p.466 For more information on alleged “Kurdish Republic of Lacin” and Armenian support to 
Kurds, see, David Nissman, “Kurds, Russians and the Pipeline”, Eurasian Studies, Vol.2, No.1 
(Spring 1995) pp.30-35 
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Georgia is reliant on Turkey for its economic improvement, and Turkey is reliant on 
Georgia for its land-ties with Azerbaijan and Central Asia. If Turkish-Georgian 
relations continue to improve and oil pipelines, railways, highways and other 
infrastructural projects are ready to connect Turkey to Azerbaijan and Central Asia, it 
seems that the future outlook of Turkey’s regional cooperation will by-pass 
Armenia.410  
From the regional viewpoint, if Turkey is able to follow a stable and 
reasonable policy in Eurasia, it should be able to realize further economic benefits 
through trade and investment - while also helping to reduce the chances of worsening 
conditions in the region's geopolitical issues.411 For example, at the beginning, all 
Turkic republics requested cash, credit, modern technology, know-how and even 
weapons from Turkey. They were disappointed when these requirements were not 
fully met. If such high expectations were not created in the beginning and if a more 
realistic approach could have been developed in relations with these countries, 
Turkey might not have had to cope with disappointment in the region today.412 
Concurrently, Turkey is also aware that for a balanced and moderate policy in 
Eurasia, it has to design a policy that will keep the American support for the BTC 
project without antagonizing Russia and Iran.413 
From the lenses of events in the last decade, Turkey cannot be successful in 
the Transcaucasus with a foreign policy that highlights religion or nationality, or 
challenging Russia directly. Turkey could be very lucrative in its relations with the 
                                                 
410 Mehmet Tütüncü, “The Caucasus Policy of Turkey (1990-1997): An Evaluation”, in Mehmet 
Tütüncü, ed., Caucasus: War and Peace, (Haarlem, Nederland: SOTA, 1998), p.198 
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Journal Of International Affairs, Vol.54 Issue 1, (Fall2000) p.217. Available at Online Database of 
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region if and when it accepts its own ethnic mosaic as something richly beneficial, 
thereby presenting a democratic model for the region when it considers the close and 
complex links between the Transcaucasus, Northern Caucasus and Central Asia. It 
becomes clear that linguistic, religious and cultural similarities may serve Turkey in 
cultivating relations with several nations of the region.414 Süleyman Demirel explains 
this as follows: 
This history is not our liability, but our great asset: being European and 
Asian at once is a unique privilege! In this era when Europe and Asia find 
themselves as parts of a larger whole, increasingly interdependent and integrated 
in tune with new realities, Turkey is no longer the flank state, but is at the very 
hub and center of today's global developments.415 
 
While policies are pursued, certain other principles should always be kept in 
mind: Turkey should keep away from giving the impression of an expansionism; 
Turkey should not create an impression of an alternate “big brother” in the region; 
Turkey should closely study the relations and the degree of dependence of these 
countries on Russia and their effect on their relations with Turkey; Turkey should 
constantly study the “threat perceptions” of these countries.416 
Briefly, along the lines of these considerations, in the present day, Turkey’s 
main interest in the Caucasus is political. Turkey considers BTC pipeline crossing its 
territory as a means for extending its influence in the region, and as an opportunity to 
consolidate its role as a vital link between Central Asia, the Caspian region and 
Caucasus. Turkish policy makers believe that the country’s importance for the West 
                                                                                                                                          
413 Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey-The Challenge to Europe and the US, (Washington, D.C.: 
Brooking Institution Press, 2000) p.110 
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415 Süleyman Demirel, “New Horizons of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000 and Beyond”, 
Çankaya Palace/Ankara, March 24, 2000  
Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/ing/conferences/25th_01.html 
416 “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Objectives”, Joint Proposals of Foreign Policy Institute on Turkey’s 
Current Foreign Policy Objectives, Foreign Policy, (Ankara), Vol. XVII, No.1-2, (1993), p.17 
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will increase as far as its role and influence are strengthened in the Caspian region 
and Central Asia. Also, energy resources and pipeline routes in the Caspian region 
are regarded as a suitable instrument to create a web of interdependence, which will 
promote welfare, stability and independent statehood in the region. The consolidation 
of the independence of regional states, particularly Azerbaijan and Georgia, is 
Turkey’s highest interest in the region.417 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
417 Ali Karaosmanoğlu, “Turkey’s Objectives in the Caspian Region”, in Gennady Chufrin, ed., The 
Security of the Caspian Sea Region, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) pp.157-158. Also 
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the independence and security of the Caspian states and their neighbors.” See, Turkish Probe, No.304, 
(Nov.8, 1998), p.15 
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APPENDIX 
 
Caspian Sea Region with Tables418  
 
Table 1. Caspian Sea Region Oil and Natural Gas Reserves 
Country Proven Oil* Reserves 
Possible Oil** 
Reserves 
Total Oil 
Reserves 
Proven 
Natural 
Gas 
Reserves 
Possible** 
Natural 
Gas 
Reserves 
Total 
Natural 
Gas 
Reserves 
Azerbaijan 3.6-12.5 BBL 32 BBL 36-45 BBL 11 Tcf  35 Tcf 46 Tcf 
Iran*** 0.1 BBL 15 BBL 15 BBL 0 Tcf 11 Tcf 11 Tcf 
Kazakhstan 10.0-17.6 BBL 92 BBL 102-110 BBL 65-70 Tcf 88 Tcf` 153-158 Tcf 
Russia*** 2.7 BBL 14 BBL 17 BBL N/A N/A N/A 
Turkmenistan 0.6 BBL 80 BBL 81 BBL 101 Tcf 159 Tcf 260 Tcf 
Total 16.9-33.4 BBL 233 BBL 251-268 BBL 177-182 Tcf 293 Tcf 470-475 Tcf 
* proven reserves are defined as oil and natural gas deposits that are considered 90% 
probable  
**  possible reserves are defined as oil and natural gas deposits that are considered 
50% probable  
*** only the regions near the Caspian are included  
BBL = billion barrels, Tcf = trillion cubic feet  
   
 
Table 2. Caspian Sea Region Oil Production and Exports 
(thousand barrels per day) 
Country Production (1990) 
Est. 
Production 
(2000) 
Possible 
Production 
(2010) 
Net Exports 
(1990) 
Est. Net 
Exports 
(2000) 
Possible 
Net 
Exports 
(2010 
Azerbaijan 259 280 1,200 77 155 1,000 
Kazakhstan 602 693 2,000 109 457 1,700 
Iran* 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia** 144 11 300 0 7 300 
Turkmenistan 1245 148 200 69 83 150 
Total 1,130 1,132 3,700 255 702 3,150 
*only the regions near the Caspian are included  
 ** includes Astrakhan, Dagestan, and the North Caucasus region bordering the 
Caspian Sea  
 
 
 
                                                 
418 US Energy Information Administration, February 2002. Available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspgrph.html 
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Table 3. Caspian Sea Region Natural Gas Production and Exports 
(billion cubic feet per year) 
Country Production (1990) 
Est. 
Production 
(2000) 
Possible 
Production 
(2010) 
Net Exports 
(1990) 
Est. Net 
Exports 
(2000) 
Possible Net 
Exports (2010) 
Azerbaijan 350 212 1,100 -272 0 500 
Kazakhstan 251 170 1,100 -257 -220 350 
Iran* 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia** 219 30 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkmenistan 3,100 1,660 3,900 2,539 1,200 3,300 
Total 3,920 2,072 6,100 2,010 980 4,150 
* only the regions near the Caspian are included  
** includes Astrakhan, Dagestan, and the North Caucasus region bordering the 
Caspian Sea  
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Table 4. Oil Export Routes and Options in the Caspian Sea Region 
Name/Location Route Crude Capacity Length 
Cost/ 
Investme
nt 
Status 
Atyrau-Samara 
Pipeline 
Atyrau 
(Kazakhstan) to 
Samara (Russia), 
linking to 
Russian pipeline 
system  
Recently 
increased to 
310,000 bbl/d 
432 miles 
Increase 
in 
capacity 
cost 
approxima
tely  
$37.5 
million 
Existing pipeline 
recently upgraded by 
adding pumping and 
heating stations to 
increase capacity. 
Baku-Ceyhan 
("Main Export 
Pipeline") 
Baku 
(Azerbaijan) via 
Tbilisi (Georgia) 
to Ceyhan 
(Turkey), 
terminating at 
the Ceyhan 
Mediterranean 
Sea port 
Planned: 1 
million bbl/d 
Approxim
ately 
1,038 
miles  
Estimated 
$2.8-$2.9 
billion  
Detailed engineering 
study began June 2001. 
Construction scheduled 
to begin in 2002, with 
completion targeted for 
2004. 
Baku-Supsa 
Pipeline (AIOC 
"Early Oil" 
Western Route) 
Baku to Supsa 
(Georgia), 
terminating at 
Supsa Black Sea 
port 
Currently: 
100,000 bbl/d; 
proposed 
upgrades to 
between 300,000 
bbl/d to 600,000 
bbl/d 
515 miles 
$600 
million 
(before 
upgrade) 
Exports began in April 
1999; approximately 
90,000 bbl/d exported 
via this route in 2000. 
Baku-
Novorossiisk 
Pipeline 
(Northern Route) 
Baku via 
Chechnya 
(Russia) to 
Novorossiisk 
(Russia), 
terminating at 
Novorossiisk 
Black Sea oil 
terminal 
100,000 bbl/d 
capacity; 
possible upgrade 
to 300,000 bbl/d 
868 miles; 
90 miles 
are in 
Chechnya  
$600 
million to 
upgrade to 
300,000 
bbl/d 
Exports began late 
1997; exports in 2000 
averaged only 10,000 
bbl/d. 
Baku-
Novorossiisk 
Pipeline 
(Chechnya 
bypass, with link 
to Makhachkala) 
Baku via 
Dagestan to 
Tikhoretsk 
(Russia) and 
terminating 
Novorossiisk 
Black Sea oil 
terminal 
Currently: 
120,000 bbl/d 
(rail and 
pipeline: 
160,000 bbl/d); 
Planned: 
360,000 bbl/d 
(by 2005) 
204 miles $140 million 
Completed April 2000. 
Eleven-mile spur 
connects bypass with 
Russia's Caspian Sea 
port of Makhachkala. 
Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium 
(CPC) Pipeline 
Tengiz oil field 
(Kazakhstan) to 
Novorossiisk 
Black Sea oil 
terminal 
Currently: 
565,000-bbl/d; 
Planned: 1.34-
million bbl/d (by 
2015) 
990 miles 
$2.5 
billion for 
Phase 1 
capacity; 
$4.2 
billion 
total when 
completed 
First tanker loaded in 
Novorossiisk (10/01); 
exports rising to 
400,000 bbl/d by end-
2002 
Gardabani-
Batumi Pipeline 
Gardabani 
(Georgia) to 
Batumi 
(Georgia) oil 
refinery  
N/A 
Reconstru
ction of an 
existing 
pipeline 
N/A 
Financing for 
reconstruction provided 
by the World Bank and 
the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development. 
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Iran-Azerbaijan 
Pipeline 
Baku to Tabriz 
(Iran) 
  Proposed 
200,000 bbl/d to 
400,000 bbl/d 
N/A $500 million 
Proposed by 
TotalFinaElf. 
Iran Oil Swap 
Pipeline 
Neka (Iran) to 
Tehran (Iran) 
175,000 bbl/d, 
rising to 370,000 
bbl/d 
208 miles $400-$500 million 
Under construction; oil 
will be delivered to 
Neka and swapped for 
an equivalent amount at 
the Iranian Persian Gulf 
coast. 
Kazakhstan-
China Pipeline 
Aktyubinsk 
(Kazakhstan) to 
Xinjiang 
(China)  
Proposed 
400,000 bbl/d to 
800,000 bbl/d 
1,800 
miles 
$3.0-3.5 
billion 
Agreement 1997; 
feasibility study halted 
in September 1999 
because Kazakhstan 
could not commit 
sufficient oil flows for 
the next 10 years. 
Kazakhstan- 
Turkmenistan-
Iran Pipeline 
Kazakhstan via 
Turkmenistan to 
Kharg Island 
(Iran) on Persian 
Gulf  
Proposed 
1million bbl/d 930 miles 
$1.2 
billion 
Feasibility study by 
TotalFinaElf; proposed 
completion date by 
2005. 
Khashuri-Batumi 
Pipeline 
Dubendi 
(Azerbaijan) via 
Khashuri 
(Georgia) to 
Batumi 
Initial 70,000 
bbl/d, rising to 
140,000 bbl/d-
160,000 bbl/d 
Rail 
system 
from 
Dubendi 
to 
Khashuri, 
then 105-
mile 
pipeline 
from 
Khashuri 
to Batumi 
$70 
million for 
pipeline 
renovation 
ChevronTexaco signed 
an agreement to rebuild 
and expand the existing 
pipeline. 
South Pipeline 
(Central Asia Oil 
Pipeline) 
Kazakhstan via 
Turkmenistan 
and Afghanistan 
to Gwadar 
(Pakistan)  
Proposed 1 
million bbl/d 
1,040 
miles  
$2.5 
billion 
Memorandum of 
Understanding signed 
by the countries; project 
stalled by regional 
instability and lack of 
financing. 
Trans-Caspian 
(Kazakhstan 
Twin Pipelines) 
Aqtau (western 
Kazakhstan, on 
Caspian coast) to 
Baku; could 
extend to Ceyhan 
N/A 370 miles to Baku 
$2-$4 
billion if 
to Ceyhan 
Feasibility study 
agreement signed in 
December 1998 by 
Royal/Dutch Shell, 
ChevronTexaco, 
ExxonMobil, and 
Kazakhstan; project 
stalled by lack of 
Caspian Sea legal 
agreement. 
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Table 5. Natural Gas Export Routes and Options in the Caspian Sea Region 
Name/Location Route Crude Capacity Length 
Cost/ 
Investme
nt 
Status 
Baku-Erzurum 
Baku 
(Azerbaijan) via 
Tbilisi (Georgia) 
to Erzurum 
(Turkey), linking 
with Turkish 
natural gas 
pipeline system 
Planned 254 Bcf 
capacity 540 miles 
$1 billion 
(includes 
up to $500 
million to 
construct 
new Azeri 
section) 
November 2000 
inspection of existing 
Gazi pipeline deemed 
that extensive repairs 
were necessary; new 
pipeline will be 
necessary. 
"Centgas" 
(Central Asia 
Gas) 
Daulatabad 
(Turkmenistan) 
via Herat 
(Afghanistan) to 
Multan 
(Pakistan). Could 
extend to India. 
700 Bcf/year 
870 miles 
to Multan 
(additional 
400 miles 
to India) 
$1.9 
billion to 
Pakistan 
(additional 
$0.5 
billion to 
India) 
Memorandum of 
Understanding signed 
by  Turkmenistan, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
and Uzbekistan. Project 
stalled. 
Central Asia 
Center Pipeline 
Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan 
via Kazakhstan 
to Saratov 
(Russia), linking 
to Russian 
natural gas 
pipeline system 
3.5 Tcf/year Existing route N/A 
Operational. 
Turkmenistan is using 
this pipeline to export 
8.83 Tcf to Ukraine (via 
Russia) from  2002-
2006, as well as smaller 
amounts to Russia. 
China Gas 
Pipeline 
Turkmenistan to 
Xinjiang (China). 
Could extend to 
Japan. 
1 Tcf/year 
4,1,61 
miles; 
more if to 
Japan 
$10 
billion to 
China; 
more if to 
Japan 
Preliminary feasibility 
study done by 
ExxonMobil, 
Mitsubishi, and CNPC 
Trans-Caspian 
Gas Pipeline 
(TCGP) 
Turkmenbashy 
(Turkmenistan) 
via Baku and 
Tbilisi to 
Erzurum, linking 
with Turkish 
natural gas 
pipeline system 
565 Bcf in first 
stage, eventually 
rising to 1.1 
Tcf/year 
1,020 
miles  
$2.0-$3.0 
billion 
Project stalled; 
negotiations between 
Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan over 
pipeline volumes 
restarted in October 
2001. 
Korpezhe-Kurt-
Kui 
Korpezhe 
(Turkmenistan) 
to Kurt-Kui 
(Iran) 
283-350 
Bcf/year; 
expansion 
proposed to 459 
Bcf/year by 2005 
124 miles 
$190 
million; 
2005 
expansion: 
$300-$400 
million 
Operational since 
December 1997. 
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Table 6. Bosporus Bypass Oil Export Routes (for Oil Transiting the Black Sea) 
 
Name/Location Route Crude Capacity Length 
Cost/ 
Investme
nt 
Status 
Albanian 
Macedonian 
Bulgarian Oil 
(AMBO) 
Pipeline 
Burgas 
(Bulgaria) via 
Macedonia to 
Vlore (Albania) 
on Adriatic coast 
750,000 bbl/d 
(could be 
expanded to 1-
million bbl/d) 
560 miles 
Est. $850 
million to 
$1.1 
billion 
Construction delayed, 
(proposed 2001-2002) as 
financing is arranged. 
Completion originally 
targeted for 2004-2005.  
Burgas 
Alexandropoulis 
(Trans-Balkan 
Oil Pipeline) 
Burgas to 
Alexandropoulis 
(Greece) on the 
Aegean Sea 
coast 
Proposed 
600,000 bbl/d to 
800,000 bbl/d 
178 miles $600 million 
Initial agreement signed 
in 1997 between 
Bulgaria, Greece, and 
Russia. Project delayed. 
Constanta-Trieste 
Pipeline 
Constanta 
(Romania) via 
Hungary, 
Slovenia, and/or 
Croatia to 
Trieste (Italy) on 
the Adriatic Sea 
coast.  Omisalj 
(Croatia) has 
also been 
proposed as a 
terminus. 
660,000 bbl/d 855 miles Est. $900 million 
Feasibility studies 
completed; financing still 
to be arranged. 
South-East 
European Line 
(SEEL) 
Constanta via 
Pancevo 
(Yugoslavia) and 
Omisalj to 
Trieste. Omisalj 
has also been 
proposed as a 
terminus. 
660,000 bbl/d 750 miles Est. $800 million 
Feasibility studies 
completed; financing still 
to be arranged. 
Odesa-Brody 
Pipeline 
Odesa (Ukraine) 
to Brody 
(Ukraine), 
linking to the 
southern 
Druzhba 
pipeline; 
optional  
 spurs to the 
northern  
   Druzhba line at 
Plotsk (Poland) 
and/or to Gdansk 
on the Baltic Sea 
coast. 
500,000 bbl/d 
400 miles 
from 
Odesa to 
Brody 
$750 
million for 
pipeline 
and 
Pivdenny 
terminal 
Construction on pipeline 
completed in August 
2001; Pivdenny terminal 
became operational in 
December 2001. Ukraine 
is seeking to sign 
contracts with Caspian oil 
exporters to fill the line. 
 
 
 
